TOP SECRET
020200Z APR 68
FOR MGEN TOMPKINS, MGEN ANDERSON, MGEN ROBERTSON, BGEN LAHUE, AND BRIG GEN OLSON FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GEN CHAPMAN AND IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE:
1. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, GENERAL WHEELER HAS PASSED A MESSAGE TO THE PACIFIC COMMANDERS AND MACV RELATED TO THE PRESIDENTS STOPPING AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF 20 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE. PORTIONS OF THE MESSAGE ARE QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:
"3. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE PERTINENT TO HIS (THE PRESIDENT'S) DECISION:
A. SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE, SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS FOR THE WAR IN SEA HAS DECREASED AT AN ACCELERATING RATE. MANY OF THE STRONGEST PROPONENTS OF FORCEFUL ACTION IN VIETNAM HAVE REVERSED THEIR POSITION, HAVE MOVED TO NEUTRAL GROUND, OR ARE WAVERING. IF THIS TREND CONTINUES UNCHECKED, PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS IN THE SEA WILL BE TOO FRAIL TO SUSTAIN THE EFFORT.
B. WEATHER OVER THE NORTHERN PORTION OF NORTH VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE UNSUITABLE FOR AIR OPERATIONS DURING THE NEXT 30 DAYS; THEREFORE, IF A CESSATION OF AIR OPERATIONS IS TO BE UNDERTAKEN, NOW IS THE BEST TIME FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT.
C. IT IS HOPED THAT THIS UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO SEEK PEACE WILL REVERSE THE GROWING DISSENT AND OPPOSITION WITHIN OUR SOCIETY TO THE WAR.
D. THE INITIATIVE WILL AID IN COUNTERING FOREIGN CRITICISM.
E. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS BEEN CONSULTED AND AGREES TO THE CESSATION
4. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN APPRAISED OF THE UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO BE TAKEN. UNDERSTAND THE REASONS THEREFOR, AND THEY ENJOIN ALL COMMANDERS TO SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ADDRESSEES, WITHOUT CITING THE SOURCE OR MENTIONING THE PRESIDENT, SHOULD DRAW ON THIS MESSAGE IN TALKING TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO SOLICIT THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. IN PARTICULAR, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DISCOURAGE MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM EXPRESSING CRITICISM TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A DELICATE MATTER AND ONE WHICH CANNOT BE APPROACHED ON THE BASIS OF ISSUING FACTS; RATHER, THE ATTITUDES OF COMMANDERS WILL PROBABLY BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN GUIDING THE REACTION OF THEIR SUBORDINATS (SUBORDINATES)."
2. I AM IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH GENERAL WHEELER'S VIEWS IN THIS MATTER AND FEEL IT IS DOUBLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR MARINE COMMANDERS FULLY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT IN HIS DECISION THROUGH OUR ATTITUDE AND IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SUBORDINATES AND THE PRESS. WE ARE IN THE DMZ AND ARE THE ONES FIRST TO BE AFFECTED BY A BOMBING PAUSE; THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE REAL PRESSURE TO CRITICIZE. THIS WILL BE A SEVERE TEST OF OUR LOYALTY BUT I AM CERTAIN, THROUGH YOUR GOOD OFFICES AND THOSE OF YOUR SUBORDINATES, WE CAN STAND THE TEST. WARMEST REGARDS." GP-4 UNQUOTE BEST REGARDS
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SECRET DECLASSIFIED
061336Z APR 68
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
1. IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE LENGTHY AND VIVID BROADCASTS OF ARMED FORCES RADIO DESCRIBING STATESIDE RIOTS, LOOTINGS, AND BURNINGS BE CURTAILED SUBSTANTIALLY TO SPOT FACTUAL REPORTS. THESE OVERLY LENGTHY AND DESCRIPTIVE BROADCASTS ARE IN SOME RESPECTS INFLAMMATORY AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY ARE ADVERSELY AFFECTING REAR AREA TROOPS IN THIS AREA...
I HAVE ALSO COUNSELED ALL COMMANDING OFFICERS TO EXERT THEIR FULL INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THIS TRAGIC EVENT DOES NOT DETRACT US FROM OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF DEFEATING COMMUNISM IN VIETNAM.
(NO "WARM REGARDS") DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
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CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED
060634Z APR 68
TO GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LTGEN KRULAK, FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
1. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MGEN TOMPKINS: QUOTE:
1. COL DAVID E. LOWNDS AND HIS TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES AT KHE SANH HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF VIETNAM NEWS SINCE 21JAN68.. DUE TO THE FIRST AIRCAV'S COMMENCEMENT OF RECENT OPERATIONS, HIS NEWS VALUE IS RAPIDLY DIMINISHING.
2. HIS NEWS VALUE TO THE MARINE CORPS IS STILL GOOD AND CAN BE GREATLY ENHANCED ON THE SPEAKERS CIRCUIT REPRESENTING THE AMERICANS AT KHE SANH AND AS THE MARINE COMMANDER WHO THWARTED GENERAL GIAP'S PLANS TO MAKE KHE SANH A SECOND DIEN BIEN PHU.
3. RECENT NEWS ARTICLES HAVE REFERRED TO THE MARINES AT KHE SANH AS "FRIGHTENED AND DEMORALIZED". COL LOWNDS' PERSONAL APPEARANCES AND TALKS WOULD SERVE TO DISPEL THESE FALSE IMPRESSIONS BY TELLING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE'S COURAGE, HIGH MORALE AND STATE OF READINESS.
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122001Z FEB 68
SECRET
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
1. I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED, SINCE MY VISIT, WITH QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE POST-TET CONDITION OF THE ARVN. CAN YOU GIVE ME A FEEL FOR WHETHER THE TET BATTLES HAVE GRAVELY AFFECTED THE ARVN'S FIGHTING CAPABILITY IN ICTZ? HOW ABOUT THEIR STRENGTH? DESERTIONS? IN OTHER WORDS, DO WE HAVE A NEW AND UNFAVORABLE SITUATION AS A RESULT OF THE MULTIPLE SHOCK RECEIVED DURING THE TET PERIOD?
2. WHEN THE NVN SENT SEVERAL IL-14 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DOWN TO THE ASHAU VALLEY THEY HAD TO HAVE SOME VERY IMPORTANT MISSION. DOES ANYBODY HAVE AN IDEA WHAT THEY WERE DELIVERING?
3. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE REDS WILL INITIATE THE BATTLE OF THE DMZ UNLESS THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY HAVE A HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF VICTORY. THIS IS UNLIKE THE BATTLE FOR THE CITIES, WHERE THEIR EFFORTS WERE IN SOME RESPECTS SUICIDAL, FOCUSED ON PROPAGANDA AND POLITICS. IF THIS IS SO, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO AVOID A WAITING POSTURE IN THE DMZ BUT, EITHER THERE OR ELSEWHERE, TO DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD SEIZE THE ENEMY'S ATTENTION, HEIGHTEN HIS CONCERN, DRAIN HIS RESOURCES AND, OVERALL, MAKE IT IMPRACTICABLE FOR HIM TO PREPARE THE DMZ BATTLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OWN DESIRES. DO YOU SEE IT THIS WAY? WHAT IS THERE THAT MIGHT BE DONE, IF RULES WERE CHANGED OR MEANS AUGMENTED?
4. IN THIS MORNING'S PAPER THERE WAS AN ARTICLE BY JACK FOISIE; DATELINE DANANG. BRIEFLY IT SAID THAT HIGH RANKING MARINES ARE "DEEPLY DISTURBED" AND "RANKLED" CONCERNING GENERAL ABRAMS' COMING TO I CORPS AS "OVERALL NORTHERN COMMANDER". IT PUT THE WHOLE THING IN AN INACCURATE AND UNFAVORABLE LIGHT. WOULD IT NOT BE A GOOD IDEA, WITH WESTY'S CONCURRENCE, FOR YOU AND ABRAMS TO HAVE THE PRESS IN AND DESCRIBE MACV FORWARD IN THE CORRECT TERMS?
WARM REGARDS
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CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED
25130Z FEB 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN//FOR GEN WESTMORELAND
1. SOME RECENT ARTICLE IN THE PRESS HAVE CONTENDED OR INFERRED THAT GENERAL ABRAMS HAS BEEN SENT TO ICTZ BECAUSE OF MARINE INCOMPETENCE. WHEN QUERIED I HAVE REPLIED THAT THE MOVE WAS TO PROVIDE GENERAL WESTMORELAND WITH A FORWARD COMMAN POST NEAR THE SCENE OF CRITICAL COMBAT, THAT IT INTERFERED WITH MY OPERATIONS NO MORE THAN GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S PRESENCE IN SAIGON INTERFERED WITH II FFV OPERATIONS, AND THAT IT WAS SOUND MILITARY PRACTICE.
2. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD MAKE SOME STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE STIGMA THEY PRESENTLY SEEK TO ATTACH TO THE STORY
WARM REGARDS
