DECLASSIFIED FROM SECRET
110910Z MAR 68
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
1. IN ORDER TO ADEQUATELY COVER THE SCOPE OF THE TUOHY ARTICLE, ONE MUST ADDRESS THREE AREAS: FIRST, THE DOWNGRADING OF MARINE CORPS COMMAND OVER US FORCES IN ICTZ; SECOND, THE ALLEGED LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BY MACV HEADQUARTERS OVER MARINE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN ICTZ; AND THIRD, SPECIFIC REBUTTAL OF THE CANARDS PUBLISHED TO SUPPORT THE TUOHY THEORY OF THE REASONS FOR THE FIRST. IN DISCUSSING THESE, THE TIME HAS COME TO BE COMPLETELY CANDID WITH OURSELVES, LEAVING THE NICETIES TO OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS.
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2. FIRST, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE APPEARS, TO ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS, TO BE AN OVERT AND DRAMATIC DOWNGRADING OF THE COMMAND EXERCISEDBY THE CG III MAF OVER THE FORCES IN ICTZ. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A LEGITIMATE REASON FOR COMUSMACV TO ESTABLISH A FORWARD COMMAND POST, THE HQTRS AT PHU BAI HAS NOT BEEN STAFFED AS A FORWARD CP, BUT RATHER STAFFED AS A SUPERIOR HQTRS TO III MAF, HEADED BY A FOR (FOUR)-STAR GENERAL, WITH A TRULY JOINT STAFF, AND WITH RANK STRUCTURES GENERALLY IN EXCESS OF THOSE AT DANANG. IT HAD NO OTHER APPARENT OPERATIONAL INTEREST THAN THE ICTZ. IT MOVED EN MASSE INTO PHU BAI DURING THE CRITICAL TET OFFENSIVE AND THE BATTLE FOR HUE AND DIVERTED MUCH OF OUR CRITICAL ENGINEERING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND LOGISTIC ASSETS FROM TACTICAL SUPPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING AND HARDENING ITS CP. IN SPITE OF LIP SERVICE TO THE ROLE OF CG III MAF, THE LARGE ENERGETIC STAFF AT PHU BAI HAS LARGELY DUPLICATED THE FUNCTIONS OF MY OWN HQTRS, AND HAS CAUSED A HEAVY BURDEN ON MY ALREADY OVERWORKED STAFF TO EDUCATE, GUIDE, AND REBUT THEIR STAFF ACTION. PROPOSALS OF MACV FWD HAVE EITHER BEEN ACCEPTED BY THIS HQTRS, OR MY ACTION MUST BE DEFENDED IN DETAIL. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND HAS RUN FROM THE ARMY DIVISIONS THROUGH III MAF TO COMUSMACV (MAC FWD), ARMY UNITS HAVE DEALT DIRECTLY WITH MACV FWD WITHOUT GOING THROUGH III MAF.
ON OCCASION, WHEN AN ARMY UNIT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH A III MAF DIRECTIVE, IT HAS GONE TO GEN ABRAMS, AND A WAY HAS BEEN FOUND NOT TO COMPLY. THIS IS KEENLY FELT BY MY STAFF, AND IT CANNOT LONG GO UNOBSERVED BY THE INTELLIGENT OBSERVER. WITH THIS PRECEDENT, I AM NATURALLY CONCERNED WITH THE RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL DEVELOP BETWEEN FROV CORPS V AND COMUSMACV. WILL THEY TRY TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER RATHER THAN THROUGH THIS HEADQUARTERS? I SHALL INSIST ON THE LATTER.
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3. SECOND, WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BY MACV HQTRS OVER MARINE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN ICTZ, I AM AFRAID MR. TUOHY HAS MISTAKEN COCKTAIL TALK FOR FACTS. IT IS AN OPEN SECRET THAT VARIOUS OFFICERS AT MACV, SOME OF WHOM HAVE ENOUGH RANK TO KNOW BETTER, HAVE OCCASIONALLY BAD-MOUTHED MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS DURING THEIR TOURS OF THE COCKTAIL CIRCUIT IN SAIGON. A DEGREE OF THIS IS TO BE EXPECTED BECAUSE OF OUR DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE, AND BECAUSE OF HONEST CONVICTIONS THAT THEIR METHODS ARE BETTER THAN OURS. HOWEVER, MR. TUOHY, IN CASTING ABOUT FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE OBVIOUS SUPERIMPOSITION OF A HIGHER COMMAND OVER III MAF, HAS SEIZED UPON THIS TALK FOR HIS ANSWER. THIS IS BAD REPORTING, BECAUSE THERE IS AN ANSWER, AND THIS IS NOT IT.
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4. I AM PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT THE MOVES HERE ARE NOT MOTIVATED BY ANY DISENCHANTMENT WITH MARINES BY ANY VALID REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS. THEY ARE DELIBERATE AND CALCULATED MOVES TO WEAKEN USMC POSITION IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLITICS,---- WHICH INVOLVES SUCH INTANGIBLES AS PUBLICITY, PRESTIGE. ETC. THESE ARE WELL THOUGHT OUT STAFF ACTIONS, AND I AM NOT CERTAIN HOW WILLINGLY THEY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AT THE TOP. THIS HAS BEEN A JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE VENTURE FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT. AS I SEE IT THE PLAN IS GENERALLY DESIGNED TO DIVIDE THE ICTZ INTO TWO PARTS, ONE UNDER ARMY COMMAND, THE OTHER UNDER MARINE. BY SO DOING, THEY ACCOMPLISH THESE ENDS:
A. THE FACT THAT THE PREDOMINANT FORCES IN ICTZ ARE STILL MARINES IS CONCEALED FROM THE PUBLIC.
B. THE MARINE CORPS AIR-GROUND TEAM IS EFFECTIVELY SPLIT UP, AND OUR POSITIONS PERTAINING TO COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE TEAM, SUCH AS OUR POSITION ON THE CONTROL OF (NOT READABLE).
C. A MARINE DIVISION IS PLACED UNDER ARMY COMMAND AND AN ARMY DIVISION CONTINUES UNDER MARINE COMMAND, WHICH ARRANGEMENT WILL SUPPORT BY HISTORICAL PRECEDENT ANY SUBSEQUENT MOVE TOWARD UNIFICATION.
D. THE 7TH AIR FORCE HAS BEEN GIVEN WHAT AMOUNTS TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. THE SPLITTING OF SUPPORTED MARINE CORPS UNITS INTO TWO WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS OF OPERATION, WITH ARMY UNITS IN BETWEEN, MITIGATES AGAINST OUR REGAINING THIS CONTROL.
E. THE MOVE WILL ULTIMATELY PLACE COMMAND OF THE ICTZ IN THE HANDS OF AN ARMY COMMANDER BY A PROCESS OF EVOLUTION RATHER THAN DEVOLUTION. THIS IS THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
(1) GENERAL ABRAMS RETURNED YESTERDAY AFTER THE STAFF AT PRCV CORPS HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED TO LOOK AFTER ARMY INTERESTS, AND AT THAT TIME CG III MAF, AS THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN ICTZ, REASSUMED OVERALL COMMAND OF ALL FORCES HERE. THE RELATIONSHIP IS SOLELY DEPENDENT UPON THE RANK OF THE INCUMBENTS, HOWEVER, AS I AM SENIOR TO LT GEN ROSSON.
(2) UPON MY DEPARTURE, AND I SHALL STAY UNTIL ASKED TO LEAVE, UNLESS RELIEVED BY A MARINE SENIOR TO LTGEN ROSSEN, ROSSON WILL BECOME THE SENIOR COMMANDER INICTZ, AND WILL ASSUME OVERALL COMMAND.
F. DURING THE TIME CG III MAF IS THE SENIOR COMMANDER IN I CORPS HE WILL HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR STAFF EXPERTISE ON MANY ARMY MATTERS. OUR REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR STAFF AUGMENTATION BY ARMY PERSONNEL HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED, AND UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS GRANTED, THE III MAF STAFF WILL BE SHORT HANDED. BY CONTRAST, THE PROVCORPSV STAFF HAS BEEN LIBERALLY PROVIDED WITH MARINES FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO COMUSMACV HEADQUARTERS. THIS SERVES THE DUAL FUNCTION OF COVERTING (CONVERTING) THE PROVCORPSV STAFF WITH A MORE TRULY JOINT STAFF THAN III MAF, AND SUBSEQUENTIALLY REDUCES MARINE CORPS PRESENCS AT HQTRS, COMUSMACV.
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5. THIRD, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FORGOING, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO REBUT EACH OF THE SPECIFIC CANARDS ENGROSSED IN SUBJECT ARTICLE.
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A. ALLEGATION: MARINE COMMANDERS HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED THEIR TROOPS FOR THE KIND OF WAR THAT HAS EVOLVED ALONG THE DMZ. SPECIFICALLY, MARINES WERE ILL-PREPARED FOR THE ARTILLERY ATTACKS AT THE NORTHERNMOST UOTPOSTS, AND DESPITE A MONTH OF OPPORTUNITY, KHE SANH WAS NOT PREPARED TO WITHSTAND AN ENEMY ARTILLERY SIEGE UNTIL IT ACTUALLY BEGAN.
FACTS: (ALONG DMZ) PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 495 BUNKERS HAD BEEN COMPLETED ALONG THE NORTHERN OUTPOSTS (DYE MARKER COMPLEX) MEETING MACV APPROVED STANDARDS WITH MINIMUM OVERHEAD THICKNESS OF MORE THAN 3-1/2 FEET. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE HUNDREDS OF BUNKERS AND COVERED FIGHTING HOLES WHICH DID NOT MEET PERMANENT STANDARDS, BUT WHICH WERE WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR TEMPORARY BATTLEFIELD USE. IN ADDITION, WE FILLED 1.5- MILLION SANDBAGS, SOWED MORE THAN 100-THOUSAND MINES, EMPLACED OVER 51-THOUSAND METERS OF BARBED WIRE. NEVERTHELESS, THE NATURE OF THE WAR IN THE AREA WAS NOT ONE THAT PERMITTED ONLY A STATIC DEFENSE AS ALLEGED. THE BULK OF THE COMBAT ACTIVITY FROM JUNE 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1967 WAS MOBILE. IT FOCUSED IN AN AREA OF ABOUT TWENTY (20) SQUARE MILES IN EXTENT, CENTERED GENERALLY AROUND HILL 158 (CON THIEN). THE HILL WAS NEVER OCCUPIED BY MORE THAN A REINFORCED BATTALION. MOST OF THE ACTION OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF CONTACT BETWEEN MARINE UNITS MANEUVERING IN THE SURROUNDING AREA AND NVA FORCES SEEKING TO PREPARE A MAJOR ATTACK ON THE HILL. TWO MAIN ENEMY INVASION ATTEMPTS WERE MADE: JULY: TWO NVA REGIMENTS WERE DEFEATED NORTH OF CON THIEN BY MARINES IN OPERATION BUFFALO; SEPTEMBER: THE 312TH REGIMENT WAS LOCATED SOUTH OF CON THIEN IN MARINE OPERATION KINGFISHER AND DRIVEN FROM THE FIELD BY A SUCCESSION OF SHORT, INTENSE GROUND ENGAGEMENTS COORDINATED WITH HEAVY SUPPORTING ARMS. FROM MARCH 1967 TO PRESENT, OVER 9,000 ENEMY DEAD HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY MARINES IN THE DMZ AREA.
(KHE SANH) WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE KHE SANH, AFTER OPERATION VIRGINIA IN APRIL 1966, KHE SANH WAS OCCUPIED BY A MARINE COMPANY FOR ALMOST A YEAR. THE FIRST MAJOR BATTLE IN THE KHE SANH AREA WAS 24 APRIL-13 MAY 1967, (DURING WHICH 4 MARINE BNS WERE DEPLOYED, WITH 949 ENEMY CONFIRMED KIA AS COMPARED TO 155 USMC KIA. THE BASE WAS PERMANENTLY GARRISONED BY ONLY ONE MARINE BATTALION FROM MAY UNTIL DECEMBER 1967. BUNKERS WERE WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR THIS SIZE UNIT. FOR THIS REASON, OUR REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR RELEASE OF DYE MARKER MATERIALS FOR USE AT KHE SANH WAS DENIED. ON 18DEC67 KHE SANH WAS REINFORCED WITH A MARINE BATTALION WHICH DUG IN. BUNKER MATERIALS WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN QUANTITY, HOWEVER, AS THERE WERE HIGHER PRIORITY ITEMS COMPETING FOR AIRLIFT. ON 22 AND 24 JANUARY 1968 TWO ADDITIONAL MARINE BATTALIONS WERE SENT TO KHE SANH. ENEMY ARTILLERY WAS FIRST REPORTED AT KHE SANH ON 24JAN68, TWO DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL OF THE LAST MARINE BATTALION. DEFICIENCIES IN BUNKERS RESULTED NOT FROM ANY NEGLIGENCE, BUT FROM THE FACT THAT THE TROOPS HAD BEEN DOUBLED DURING THE WEEK BEFORE THE FIRST ARTILLERY ATTACK, AND THE ALL-AERIAL RESUPPLY COULD NOT PROVIDE ALL BUNKER MATERIAL DESIRED IN ADDITION TO COMBAT ESSENTIAL FOOD AND MUNITIONS. HOW WELL THE MARINES WITHSTOOD THE ARTILLERY SIEGE IS REFLECTED IN CASUALTY STATISTICS. SINCE THE SIEGE BEGAN ON 21 JANUARY 1968, AS OF 5 MARCH 1968 KHE SANH HAD RECEIVED 3,472 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 1,519 ARTILLERY ROUNDS, AND 967 ROCKETS. A TOTAL OF 5,958 ROUNDS. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE KHE SANH GARRISON HAD 124 MARINES KILLED WHICH INCLUDES CASUALTIES FROM GROUND ATTACKS BY FIRE. EVEN IF ALL THE CASUALTIES HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF ENEMY ARTILLERY/MORTAR/ROCKET FIRE, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO ONE CASUALTY (KIA) FOR EVERY 50 ROUNDS--NOT A VERY IMPRESSIVE RESULT FOR AN "UNPREPARED" OBJECTIVE.
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B. ALLEGATION: TOP MARINE LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM HAS BEEN SINGULARLY UNIMPRESSIVE.
FACTS: IN ADDITION TO REFUTING THE DETAILS LISTED BY TUOHY IN SUPPORT OF THIS CONCLUSION, MARINE LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE EVALUATED UPON THE BASIS OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OR FAILURES OF ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. I BELIEVE A PER CAPITA KILL RATIO SHOWING RESULTS VIS-A-VIS ARMY WOULD BE FRUITFUL, BUT I DO NOT HAVE THE ARMY FIGURES. ALSO, IT WOULD BE OF VALUE TO COMPARE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE ENEMY (VC AND NVA SEPARATELY) IN ICTZ WITH THE PERCENTAGE IN THE REMAINDER OF SVN. AND COMPARE THIS AGAINST THE PERCENTAGE U.S. TROOPS IN ICTZ VIS-A-VIS ALL OF VIETNAM. TGHESE FIGURES HAVE NOT BEEN RETAINED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS. BUT ARE BELIEVED TO BE AVAILABLE AT HQMC. ALSO OF INTEREST IS OUR EMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION OF OCCUPIED AREAS, IN WHICH WE EXCELLED, THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS GIVE SOME INDICATION OF OUR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE KILL RATIO IN 1967 AND 1968 REFLECT NOT ONLY THE DYE MARKER LOSSES, BUT THOSE OCCASIONED BY THE BOOBY-TRAP WAR.
ICTZ CASUALTIES-MARCH 1965-FEBRUARY 1968
MAR65-DEC65//
USMC//292 KIA
ENEMY//2,560 KIA
RATIO: 1/8.77
1966
USMC//1,326 KIA
ENEMY//10,724 KIA
RATIO: 1/8.08
1967
USMC//3,015 KIA
ENEMY//17,349 kia
RATIO: 1/5.75
JAN68
USMC//310 KIA
ENEMY//2,211 KIA
RATIO: 1.713
FEB68
USMC//647 KIA
ENEMY//5,040 KIA
RATIO: 1/1.77
TOTAL
USMC//5,590 KIA
ENEMY// 37,884
RATIO: 1/6.77
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C. ALLEGATION: VAST TIME CONSUMING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS THAT DO NOT RESULT IN CONTACT.
FACTS: SINCE AUGUST 1965 THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE HAS CONDUCTED 41 NAMED OPERATIONS. ALL BUT SIX HAVE RESULTED IN CONFIRMED ENEMY KILLS. IN 1967 OPERATIONS WHICH THE SLF CONDUCTED UNILATERALLY OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER FORCES, ACCOUNTED FOR OVER 3200 ENEMY KIA VS LOSSES OF UNDER 550. TWENTY OF THE OPERATIONS LASTED ONE WEEK OR LESS. ONLY THREE HAVE EXCEEDED TWO WEEKS, WITH THE LONGEST BEING FOR 22 DAYS.
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D. ALLEGATION: FORAYS INTO THE DMZ BY UNDERSTRNGTH UNITS.
FACT: NO BASIS OF FACT. MOST INFANTRY UNITS ARE BELOW T/0 AND MANNING LEVEL WHEN IN COMBAT; HOWEVER THE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH HAS BEEN WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR MISSION ASSIGNED.
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E. ALLEGATION: FAILURE TO ACCEPT INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY UNITS SUPPLIED BY MACV FROM ITS MANY SOURCES.
FACTS: ALL INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO THE ENEMY BUILD-UP IN ICTZ HAS BEEN MINUTELY FOLLOWED. MUCH OF THE INTELLIGENCE HELD BY MACV WAS, IN FACT, RECEIVED FROM AND THROUGH III MAF RESOURCES. THE LOCATION OF MAJOR VC AND NVA UNITS IN ICTZ HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN PLOTTED BY III MAF WITH GREATER ACCURACY THAN MACV. LOCAL WARNINGS PERTAINING TO THE DEGREE OF ROCKET THREAT HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY ACCURATE. THE NIGHT OF 20 DECEMBER III MAF SIMULATED AN ATTACK AGAINST DANANG, CAUSING THE ENEMY TO REACT PREMATURELY AND RESULTING IN THE CAPTURE OF THE FIRST COMPLETE 122MM ROCKET LAUNCHER AND THE SPOILING OF A PLANNED ROCKET ATTACK. THE TET TRUCE WAS DISCONTINUED IN ICTZ AT III MAF'S PROMPTING BASED ON ENEMY INTELLIGENCE. PRIOR TO TET, III MAF MOVED TWO BATTALIONS OF ARMY TROOPS INTO THE DANANG AREA BASED UPON THIS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A RESULT SAVED THE CITY OF DANANG FROM ENTRY AND DAMAGE. AT THE TIME OF THE SO-CALLED "SURPRISE" ENEMY ATTACK AT TET, THE ENTIRE III MAF STAFF WAS MANNING THEIR POSITIONS IN THE COMMAND CENTER, ALL OF THE SUBORDINATE UNITS WERE ON 100 PERCENT ALERT. THROUGHOUT ICTZ, WHERE THE ENEMY CONCENTRATED HIS GREATEST STRENGTH, HE WAS DEFEATED MORE RAPIDLY AND MORE THOROUGHLY THAN ANYWHERE ELSE IN VIETNAM. EXCEPT FOR HUE, WHICH INITIALLY WAS SOLELY DEFENDED BY ARVN FORCES, ALL ICTZ CITIES FARED BETTER THAN CITIES IN OTHER CORPS TACTICAL ZONES, INCLUFWNG (INCLUDING) THE CITY OF SAIGON, HEADQUARTTERS FOR COMUSMACV.
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F. ALLEGATION: RASH AND COSTLY ASSAULTS ON ENTRENCHED ENEMY POSITIONS OF LIMITED VALUE.
FACTS: MARINE CORPS TACTICS ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE FORTIFIED POSITIONS WITH THE FEWEST CASUALTIES. OUR DOCTRINE REQUIRES MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING FIRES. IN THOSE FEW INSTANCES WHERE THERE MAY HAVE INITIALLY HAVE APPEARED TO BE AN ASSAULT UPON FORTIFIED POSITIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE COORDINATION, SUCH AS IN OPERATION BADGER TOOTH, IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE ATTACKING TROOPS WERE UNAWARE THAT THE AREA ASSAULTED WAS FORTIFIED. IN A WAR OF THE NATURE OF THIS CONFLICT, ENTRENCHED POSITIONS CANNOT BE BYPASSED AND ISOLATED AS IN CONVENTIONAL WAREFARE (WARFARE), BUT THEY MUST BE REDUCED, REDUCTION OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS, EVEN WITH THE BEST OF TACTICS, MAY OCCASIONALLY PROVE COSTLY. THIS DOES NOT QUALIFY THE REDUCTION AS BEING RASH OR RECKLESS.
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G. ALLEGATION: OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FORCES AND SUPPORT.
FACTS: NO OPERATION LAUNCHED TO DATE HAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE FORCES OR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ALWAYS TIMES WHEN MORE FORCES AND MORE SUPPORT COULD HAVE BEEN USED, NO MISSION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE UNITS TASKED WITH THE OPERATION. NO WAR IN HISTORY HAS RECEIVED SUCH ADEQUATE SUPPORT. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF LOGISTICS--OF ORDNANCE AVAILABLE, FOOD AVAILABLE, EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE, AND CREATURE COMFORTS AVAILABLE, MARINE FORCES HAVE FARED WELL THROUGHOUT ALL OPERATIONS. FIRE SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY. THE MARINE AIF-GROUND TEAM CONCEPT HAS PROVIDED THE BEST SYSTEM OF AIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO ANY MODERN ARMED FORCE.
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H. ALLEGATION: FAILURE TO EMPLOY HELICOPTERS PROPERLY.
FACTS: PRIOR TO EACH HELICOPTER ASSAULT AN AVIATION SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS HELD AT THE MARINE DIVISION OR REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST OF THE GROUND UNIT INVOLVED. REPRESENTING THE WING IS A WING PLANS/LIAISON OFFICER, THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROLLER (AIRBORNE), AND HELICOPTER COMMANDER (AIRBORNE) WHO WILL DIRECT THE AIR STRIKES AND COORDINATE THE ASSAULT, ARE ALSO PRESENT TO OBTAIN A COMPLETE AND THOROUGH BRIEFING FROM THE INFANTRY UNIT COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE THE CONFERENCE AN OVERFLIGHT OF THE AREA BY THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER AND THE INFANTRY UNIT LEADERS IS CONDUCTED. THE ASSAULT IS PRECEDED BY EXTENSIVE FIXED WING AIR STRIKES IN THE LZ AREA AND ADJACENT THREAT AREAS. THE APPLICATION OF THE AIR ASSAULT WEAPONS IS LIBERAL IN SUPPORT OF THE HELICOPTERS AND INFANTRY UNITS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE LANDING, FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT AND HELICOPTER REINFORCEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE FROM THE MARINE TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CENTER. A QUICK REACTION PACKAGE OF TWO UH-1E ARMED HELICOPTERS, TWO CH-46 ASSAULT TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, AND A PLATOON OF MARINES IS MAINTAINED AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN PHU BAI, AND QUANG TRI. EACH ON FIFTEEN MINUTE ALERT. FURTHER, THE DASC OR TADC CAN DIVERT FIXED WING OR HELICOPTER FLIGHTS IN THE AIR TO PROVIDE SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY IN ANY EMERGENCY.
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I. ALLEGATION: SOME OF THE WEAKNESSES IN THE MARINES STRATEGY AND TACTICS ARE NOT OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THE MARINES STRUCTURE WAS DESIGNED FOR HIT-AND-RUN ASSAULTS, THEIR HELICOPTERS FOR SHIP-TO-SHORE OPERATIONS, AND MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT FOR THE SHORT-TIME PULL. IN VIETNAM THEY FIND THEMSELVES FIGHTING A LONG HAUL IN A RUGGED AREA WHERE THE HEAVIER ARMY DIVISIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.
FACTS: MR. TUOHY IS GROSSLY MISINFORMED AS TO THE NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS. THE MISSION OF THE MARINE DIVISION IS TO EXECUTE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS AND SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS MAY BE DIRECTED. TO FULFILL THESE MISSIONS, MARINE CORPS FORCES HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED, TRAINED, AND EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY THE WORLD'S MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ASSAULT LANDING FORCES, BUT ALSO----WHEN LANDED----TO CONDUCT LAND OPERATIONS ALONG THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF LAND WARFARE. DURING AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IT DIFFERS FROM A CONVENTIONAL ARMY IN THAT IT CARRIES ITS INITIAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT WITH IT RATHER THAN RELYING UPON OTHER FORCES, BUT ONCE SUSTAINED ASHORE, ITS LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS SIMILAR TO A CONVENTIONAL ARMY. FOR INITIAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS THE MARINE DIVISION IS TAILORED WITH LIGHT AND MOBILE, ALTHOUGH DURABLE, GEAR; BUT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IT HAS IN ITS FORCE TROOPS ALL THE ITEMS OF HEAVY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED LAND COMBAT. THE MARINE DIVISIONS IN VIETNAM ARE NOW SUPPORTED BY BY HEAVY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTICAL IN MOST RESPECT TO THOSE OF THE ARMY. IT HAS TANKS, LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY ARTILLERY, ETC., FOR CONVENTIONAL LAND WARFARE. ITS HELICOPTERS ARE NOT ONLY CARRIER-CAPABLE, BUT ARE PROCURED WITH AIR MOBILE OPERATIONS IN MIND. EACH MARINE DIVISION IS THE ICTZ HAS MORE FIREPOWER, MORE PERSONNEL IN THE FRONT LINES, MORE HELICOPTER LIFT AVAILABLE, AND MORE COMBAT CAPABILITY THAN HAS ONY (ONLY) ONE OF THE THREE ARMY DIVISIONS IN ICTZ. TO EPITOMIZE THE MARINES AS A SINGLE-MISSION FORCE IS TO DISPLAY GREAT IGNORANCE OF THEIR CAPABILITY.
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J. ALLEGATION: UNDERSTRENGTH BATTALIONS WERE THROWN HASTILY INTO BATTLE.
FACTS: AT THE TIME THE NVA STARTED THE TET OFFENSIVE IN HUE THE NIGHT OF 30-31 JANUARY TASK FORCE X-RAY FORCES WERE FULLY COMMITTED IN THE ASSIGNED AREA OF OPERATIONS AND NO RESERVE WAS AVAILABLE. THEREFORE, UNITS WERE COMMITTED TO OPERATION HUE CITY AS THEY COULD BE RELIEVED BY READJUSTMENT OF FORCES WITIN THE AO AND THE ARRIVAL OF OTHER UNITS OPCON TASK FORCE XRAY. AS A RESULT ENTIRE BATTALIONS COULD NOT BE COMMITTED AT THE START OF THE OPERATION AS THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE. INSTEAD THE BUILD-UP WAS COMPLETED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BUT WITH UNITS OF COMPANY SIZE. FORCES WERE COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
31 JAN 1/1 COMMAND GROUP, A 1/1, G/2/5, AND 1 SECTION 81MM MORTARS ASSUMED OPCON OF 4 TANKS-2 GUN AND 2 FLAME AT THE HUE RAMP ENROUTE TO 3D MARDIV. 01 FEB F/2/3, 2 ONTOS, 1 SECTION 81MM MORTARS
02 FEB H/2/3, 2 ONTOS, 2 M42 DUSTERS USA (OPCON TO TFX)
04 FEB B/1/1
09 FEB 2 ONTOS
17 FEB 5 GUN TANKS, 2 FLAME TANKS (3RD MARDIV TANKS RELIEVED)
(UNIT STRENGTHS INCLUDED HERE)
THESE UNITS WERE ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF CLEARING THE CITY SOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER.
ON 10 FEBRUARY TFX WAS ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF CLEARING THE ENEMY FROM THE SOUTHEAST SECTION OF THE CITADEL, IN HUE CITY NORTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER. THE 1/327, 1ST BRIGADE, 101 ABN DIV WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO TFX AND STARTED TO RELIEVE 1/5 IN THE PHU LOC AREA WHERE THEY HAD BEEN OPERATING SINCE 29 DECEMBER. FORCES WERE COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
10 FEB A/1/5
11 FEB 1/5 COMMAND GROUP, B/1/5, C/1/5, AND 1 TANK PLATOON OF 5 TANKS
12 FEB MOVED INTO POSITION TO ATTACK
13 FEB ATTACK COMMENCED AT 0750
14 FEB D/1/5
19 FEB 2 ONTOS
21 FEB L/3/5
22 FEB B/1/5 WITHDRAWN FROM HUE
23 FEB 1/5 MOVED FROM CITADEL TO SOUTH SIDE OF PERFUME RIVER TO PARTICIPATE IN MOPPING UP OPERATIONS NORTH OF E-W GL YD20.
(UNIT STRENGTHS INCLUDED HERE)
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE LISTED STATISTICS REVEALS THAT THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION MADE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE TIMELY REPLACEMENTS TO THE FORCES COMMITTED TO OPERATION HUE CITY AND THAT UNDERSTRENGTH BATTALIONS WERE NOT THROWN HASTILY INTO BATTLE.
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K. ALLEGATION: MARINE FORCES IN HUE WERE NOT PROPERLY SUPPLIED WITH MEN AND AMMUNITION.
FACTS: (DETAILS/STATISTICS FOLLOW TO REFUTE ALLEGATION)
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L. ALLEGATION: NO SERIOUS EFFORT WAS MADE TO KEEP THE SEVEN-MILE ROAD BETWEEN PHU BAI AND HUE, WHICH THE ENEMY INTERDICTED AT WILL, TURNING BACK BIG CONVOYS.
FACTS: (EVIDENCE TO REFUTE ALLEGATION PRESENTED)
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M. ALLEGATION: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM BATTALION TO DIVISION WAS CONFUCED (CONFUSED).
FACTS: (EVIDENCE TO REFUTE ALLEGATION PRESENTED)
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N. ALLEGATION: LITTLE COORDINATION BETWEEN MARINES AND THE VIETNAMESE FORCES WAS IN EVIDENCE. (HUE CITY).
FACTS: (EVIDENCE TO REFUTE ALLEGATION PRESENTED)
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(0.) ALLEGATION: THERE WAS LITTLE FIRM INSTRUCTION TO TROOPS ON HOW TO COMPORT THEMSELVES IN DEVASTATED URBAN AREA. HENCE LOOTING WAS COMMON.
FACTS: AT THE START OF THE OPERATION THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER, 1ST MARINES THROUGH BATTALION COMMANDERS, OFFICERS AND NCO'S GAVE EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS THAT LOOTING AND PILLAGE WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED, PERIODIC SHAKEDOWNS WERE HELD, ALL MOVES WERE ON FOOT WHICH DISCOURAGES LOOTING. SOME ITEMS WERE REMOVED FROM DAMAGED BUILDING(S) FOR SAFE KEEPING AND SENT TO THE 1ST MARINES COMMAND POST. INCLUDED WERE SOME MICROSCOPES FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF HUE, TAPE RECORDERS, PIASTERS, JEWELRY, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS. MANY ITEMS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THE PROPER OWNERS AND OTHERS ARE BEING HELD PENDING DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP. (ALLEGATION REBUTTAL CONTINUES)
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P. ALLEGATION: THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE HELICOPTERS, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE RESUPPLY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION, WAS SPOTTY AND UNDEPENDABLE...(ALLEGATION CONTINUES)
FACTS: (EVIDENCE TO REFUTE ALLEGATION PRESENTED)
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Q. ALLEGATION: THE MARINE GENERAL IN COMMAND OF THGE AIR WING ORDERED HELICOPTERS NOT TO FLY IN LESS THAN A 500 FOOT CEILING. LOW CEILINGS WERE COMMON DURING THE 25 DAY BATTLE FOR HUE.
FACTS: (EVIDENCE TO REFUTE ALLEGATION PRESENTED)
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R. ALLEGATION: AS MARINES LAY WOUNDED, VAINLY WAITING FOR ONE OF THE DOZENS OF MARINE HELICOPTERS GROUNDED AT PHU BAI ONLY TEN MINUTES AWAY, U.S. ARMY "HUEY" HELICOPTERS ARRIVED AT HUE ON ROUTINE MISSIONS
FACTS:THE WEATHER DURING THIS PERIOD WAS MARGINAL AT BEST. (REBUTTAL CONTINUES WITH EVIDENCE) THE ABOVE ALLEGATION IS NOT ONLY UNTRUE, BUT IS GROSSLY UNFAIR TO A GROUP OF DEDICATED PILOTS WHO DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB UNDER VERY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS.
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7. I REALIZE THE FOREGOING IS LENGTHY AND DETAILED; HOWEVER, IT PROVIDES BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL INFORMATION FROM WHICH YOU CAN GLEAN THAT WHICH MAY BE USEFUL IN YOUR EVALUATION OF THE ARTICLE, AND IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS OF IT. WARM REGARDS.
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General Westmoreland's Position:
260935Z FEB 68
FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
TO LTGEN CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
CONFIDENTIAL MAC 02707 EYES ONLY.
1. FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER PRESS STORIES WHICH INFER MARINE INCOMPETENCE AS RESULT OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MACV FORWARD, ALTHOUGH I PERSONALLY HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SUCH STORIES.
2. THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDING HERE WITH THE VARIOUS NEWS BUREAU CHIEFS TO POINT OUT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MACV FORWARD CARRIED NO STIGMA WHATSOEVER WITH REPECT TO THE MARINES, THAT IT WAS MERELY A NORMAL MILITARY PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING A FORWARD HEADQUARTERS NEAR THE SCENE OF IMPENDING CRITICAL COMBAT, AND THAT IT WAS ONLY TEMPORARY.
3. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH GENERAL SIDLE AND WE AGREE THAT A STATEMENT BY ME TO THE PRESS AT THIS TIME WOULD APPEAR DEFENSIVE AND WOULD SERVE PRIMARILY TO HIGHLIGHT THE MATTER. MOREVER, THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL ROSSON IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH RESULT SHOULD CLEARLY PUT THE MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SIT TIGHT AND LET THE SITUATION CLARIFY ITSELF. BEST REGARDS
