Mamasan Beach hs/27
RLT.Two.Seven
Tuesday, July 23, 2024
Tuesday, April 9, 2024
Monday, April 17, 2023
27TH MARINES--The Road to Duong Son (2)--PART ONE: PUSHIN' TOO HARD
27th Marines
In January, 1968, at the White House in Washington, DC, LBJ was surrounded by his advisors and high-ranking military men from all branches. The president had received a request from US Army General Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, for two-hundred thousand additional troops to break the combined NVA-VC Tet offensive. The advisors were at the moment more concerned with the rising tide of unpopularity of the war Back-in-the-World. At least one general wanted to crush the rebellion on the homefront, using any means necessary. Obviously this was not an option, neither was granting Westy’s request. Instead, LBJ opted for two units to go over, the US Army 82nd Airborne and another unit, a newly formed landing team out of Camp Pendleton, the 27th Marines.
“Private L'Angelle, I didn’t think you were going to go along.”
James C. L'Angelle USMC 1965-70
Sunday, April 16, 2023
HILL55--The Battle for Go Noi Island--MAY 1968
27th Marine Combat Regiment RVN 1968
Operation Allen Brook--
(DUONG SON 2)--Early summer, 1968: Operation Allen Brook had begun and the 27th Marines was set to drop in on the VC south of their positions on Go Noi Island and push the enemy North, from Cu Ban and Le Bac into the Song Thu Bon just below Nui Dat Son, Hill 55.. It didn't quite work out that way. The enemy was well entrenched on the so-called "island" and wasn't giving an inch of swamp. Part of the radio platoon from regimental H&S company was assigned to the north side of Liberty Bridge to coordinate the operation between the units in the bush and command back at Duong Son 2.Several very important events took place in the rather insignificant op, at least from a personal standpoint. The first was saturation bombing using C-130s dropping 55-gallon drums of napalm into those enemy fortifications hoping to dislodge them. Following the dropping of the drums, the area was hammered with 155 artillery and the entire island lit up like New Year's Eve, in the middle of the day. That was followed by a huge rain squall forming from the black cloud that rose from the ensuing fire caused by the combined napalm-artillery saturation. Must have dumped an inch of rain in less than an hour. Still the helis kept coming in, dropping off body bags and picking up ammo, water and rations for the companies pinned down by enemy machine guns from bunkers tactically placed to maximize the kill zone. One Marine charged those bunkers, managed to shut them down for a little while, lost his life in the process, and was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his valiant effort.
Change of command in Saigon resulted in the new boss who replaced Westy, US Army General Creighton Abrams, to show up unannounced in the bunker at Liberty Bridge where the radios were buzzing with the sounds of the firefights and calls for air support and arty. One of the line officers was hollering something about casualty reports and it might have been Abrams who commented, or was told;
"You're in the game with the big boys now..."
Later on, the radio operators took a break and dodged the relentless downpour by huddling in a makeshift shower, smoking some pot and philosophizing on what was coming down. It was Cpl. Morze, a hefty Marine who looked more Chinese than White, and who could speak fluent Chinese, summed it all up;
"Who picks up the tab for civilization?"
Before the unit wrapped up the forward setup, I was fortunate to spend one night in a radio relay jeep overlooking the island from Hill 55, on the AT map at 970620, Nui Dat Son.. There are many things I remember about the war, but that's one I will never forget, for several reasons. It was the one and only time I was free from the regiment back at Duong Son 2; I had some cans of beer, some pot, some cigarettes, and a radio jeep tuned into a Danang station.Late in the night, I could look out over the island and beyond as flares randomly lit up the night sky way off in the distance to the south. It was the only night that I had no one to tell me what to do, where to go, and report to whom. There was nobody else around, just the jeep, the flares way off in the war somewhere, the necessities of Black Label beer, mamasan's pot and Pall Mall cigarettes. On the radio came a song I remember to this day and every time I hear it, I go back to that one night on Hill 55.
James C. L'Angelle, USMC 1965-70
Monday, March 28, 2022
JOHN MCKAY--Corry Field 1966--1ST RADIO BN.
27th Marine Combat Regiment
James C. L'Angelle USMC
Sunday, October 31, 2021
GO NOI ISLAND---23 Aug 1968--
Saturday, August 1, 2020
Monday, May 18, 2020
Wednesday, December 25, 2019
THE PENTAGON PAPERS--Deployment of the 27th RLT--TET, 1968
VOL. III--U. S. GROUND STRATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, 1965--1967
The enemy ' s TET offensive, which began with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on 31 January 1968, although it had been predicted, ~/ took the U.S. command and the U.S. public by surprise, and its strength, length, and intensity prolonged this shock. As the attacks continued, the Secretary of Defense, on 9 February, requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish plans which would provide for emergency reinforcement of COMUSMACV (pdf 8)
The three plans for emergency reinforcement examined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were:
a . Plan One, which is based upon prompt deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/wing team, callup of some 120,000 Army and Marine Corps Reserves, and appropriate legislative action to permit extension of terms of service of active duty personnel and the recall of individual Reservists .
b . Plan Two, which would deploy as many Marine Corps battalions as are now available in CONUS, less one battalion in the Caribbean, the battalion in the Mediterranean, and the Guantanamo Defense Force. This plan would not be based upon a callup of Reservists or legislative action.
c. Plan Three, which would deploy the 82nd Airborne Division but would leave Marine Corps battalions in CONUS . This plan would likewise envisage no Reserve callup and no legislative action. (pdf 9-10)
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense almost immediately approved the deployment of one brigade of the 82ncl Airborne Division and one Marine regimental landing team to South Vietnam. A total strength of almost 10,500 was assumed and publicly announced. (pdf 12)
The Marine Corps Regiment was to close in SVN not later than 26 February also. The Regiment (reinforced) less one battalion, was to be deployed by air from California at a strength of about 3,600. One battalion (reinforced) which was then embarked, "was to be deployed by surface at a strength of about 1,600. ~/
In view of the wide variation of strength associated vii th a Marine Corps Regiment (reinforced), CINCPAC was directed to advise all concerned of the identity, composition and strength of the force selected for deployment. 1/ CINCPAC nominated the 27th Marine Regiment, which included 5247 Marine and 327 Navy personnel. (pdf 12)
( 2) The Reserve force will consist of approximately 12,000 personnel. It will provide the capability to deploy a balanced, self-sustaining air/ground combat force in relief of the lightly structured 27th Marines (Rein) and permit return of the 27th Marine Regiment (Rein) to the training/rotation base in CONUS/Hawaii . This exchange would commence as soon as the Reserve unit becomes combat-ready (approximately 60 days after callup) and must be completed not later than 120 days after deployment of RLT-27. (pdf 13)
c. Navy. Support of the newly authorized deployments will require the callup of two Navy mobile construction battalions (NMCB ) totalling 1,700 personnel and 600 individual medical/ dental/chaplain Reservists . These callups will provide for bringing recalled Marine units up to strength, sustaining the Navy personnel organic to the deployed RLT. (pdf 14)
2. The Troop Request
Although the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, was formally sworn into office by the President on 1 March, his work had begun many days before .
In order to ascertain the situation in SVN and to determine subsequent MACV force requirements , General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been sent by the President to Saigon on 23 February. His report was presented to the President on 27 February 1968 . On the basis of this report, and the recommendations it contained, the President ordered the initiation of a complete and searching reassessment of the entire U. S. strategy and commitment in South Vietnam. (pdf 18)
New ceiling in RVN: 549, 500
a. Program 5: 525,000.
b. Emergency deployment of 82d Abn, 27th RLT : 11,000.* 13,500 .*
c. Support and sustain emergency deployment:
d. Total: 549,500.
Includes estimated 1,444 Air Force and Navy.
1st Bde , 5th Inf Div (Mech) ,Will replace 27th RLT . (pdf 83)
6. JCS Msg 9929, 130341Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Corps Regiment (Reinforced) to SVN (S)."
7 • Ibid.
8. CINCPAC Msg to JCS/CINCSTRIKE, 150125Z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Regiment (U)" JCS in 12316. (pdf 100)
Source, https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-C-6-c.pdf
















