27th Marine Regiment (Rein), FMF
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)
Subj. Command Chronology, April 2025
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2B
CLASSIFIED
SIGINT Breached--The Yemen Civil War--A Command Chronology Exclusive
1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.
DISTRIBUTION: "Special": S&C (2); Div (8)
PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS
PART IV GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE, INDIGENOUS POPULATION
PART V CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART VI SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
1. The primary allied military operations targeting the Houthis are:
a. Operation Poseidon Archer: US-UK airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.
b. Operation Prosperity Guardian: A broader defensive coalition of over 20 countries patrolling the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden to protect shipping lanes
c. Saudi-led Coalition: Since 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia (including UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and supported at times by the US, UK, France, Germany, and Canada) has conducted operations against the Houthis, primarily through airstrikes and some ground deployments.
2. Location
a. Airstrikes and naval operations are concentrated in Houthi-controlled western Yemen, especially along the Red Sea coast, and in maritime corridors including the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden.
b. Coalition naval forces operate in international waters adjacent to Yemen, focusing on protecting shipping lanes from Houthi attacks.
3. Command Structure
a. The command structure for allied operations against the Houthis in Yemen is primarily centered around the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), with the United Kingdom as a key partner and additional support from several allied nations. These operations are distinct from, but related to, broader maritime security efforts in the region.
b. USCENTCOM serves as the principal command authority, coordinating joint operations and airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.
c. Core Coalition Partners: The United Kingdom is the main operational partner, conducting coordinated airstrikes alongside the U.S.
d. Other supporting nations have included Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, providing various forms of support such as intelligence, logistics, and possibly operational assets.
4. Allied Strength
a. The anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen, particularly since the escalation of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in late 2023, has been led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom, with support from several allied nations. The campaign, codenamed Operation Poseidon Archer, is focused on air and missile strikes rather than a ground invasion.
b. Personnel: The precise number of allied personnel involved in the air and naval campaign has not been officially disclosed. Aircraft carriers typically operate with crews of 5,000–6,000 sailors and airmen each, but not all are directly involved in strike operations.
c. The anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen is a large-scale, multinational air and naval operation led by the US and UK, with significant assets deployed but no reported ground invasion force.
5. Operation Poseidon Archer
a. A coordinated U.S.–U.K. military campaign launched in January 2024 in response to Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.
b. Coalition Structure
(1) Lead Nations: United States and United Kingdom.
(2) Supporting (Non-operational) Partners: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, and New Zealand.
c. Military Assets
(1) Naval Forces: U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers (e.g., USS Carney, USS Philippine Sea, USS Mason, USS Gravely), at least one U.S. submarine, and the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower.
(2) Air Power: U.S. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from carriers, U.K. Royal Air Force Typhoon jets
d. Operation Poseidon Archer is characterized by sustained, high-tempo, precision military action leveraging advanced Western naval and air power, with an emphasis on coalition coordination and minimizing escalation while protecting vital maritime trade routes.
6. Anti-Houthi Forces & Strategic Context
a. Opposition forces: Yemeni factions (e.g., Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Force, Southern Giants Brigade) are planning a ground offensive targeting Hodeidah and the Red Sea coast, potentially involving 80,000+ troops.
b. U.S. involvement: Operation Rough Rider (March 2025 airstrikes) degraded Houthi capabilities, but experts note resilience in ground forces.
PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
1. Background: The Yemeni civil war, ongoing since 2014, stems from long-standing political instability, sectarian tensions, and regional power struggles. Here's a structured breakdown of key elements:
a. Political Fragmentation: Yemen’s unification in 1990 failed to integrate northern and southern military forces, leading to a brief civil war in 1994.
b. Houthi Rise: The Houthi movement, rooted in Zaydi Shia traditions in northern Yemen, began armed resistance in 2004 against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government over political marginalization and economic grievances.
c. Arab Spring Fallout: The 2011 uprising ousted Saleh, but his successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, inherited a weak government plagued by corruption, unemployment, and militant groups like al-Qaeda.
2. Conflict Escalation
a. Houthi Takeover: In September 2014, Houthi rebels seized Sanaa, exploiting public anger over fuel subsidies and Hadi’s ineffective governance. By January 2015, they dissolved parliament and placed Hadi under house arrest.
b. Saudi-Led Intervention: After Hadi fled to Aden and requested international help, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition launched airstrikes in March 2015 to restore his government, fearing Iranian influence via Houthi ties.
3. Key Dynamics
a. Proxy War: The conflict is widely seen as a Saudi-Iran proxy war, with Iran accused of arming Houthis (though direct evidence is limited), while Saudi Arabia and the UAE back Hadi’s government.
b. Humanitarian Crisis: Over 8.4 million face starvation, and 75% of the population relies on aid. Cholera outbreaks and collapsed healthcare systems have exacerbated suffering.
c. Internal Divisions: Pro-Hadi forces include southern separatists and Islamist militias, while Houthis allied with Saleh until his death in 2017.
3. Recent Developments
a. Stalemate: By 2020, Houthis gained the upper hand, controlling Sanaa and much of the north. A 2022 UN ceasefire briefly reduced violence but lapsed in October 2022.
b. Red Sea Tensions: In 2023, Houthis targeted commercial ships and Israel-linked vessels, expanding the conflict’s regional scope amid the Israel-Hamas war.
PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS
1. Houthi Forces: Organizational Data
a. The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, is led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who exercises centralized authority over both military and political spheres.
b. The Supreme Political Council, currently chaired by Mahdi al-Mashat, acts as the chief executive body for the Houthi-controlled areas.
c. The Political Bureau is the main political organ, with members appointed directly by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi; its exact size is unknown, possibly ranging from dozens to hundreds.
d. The military command is organized into Military Regional Commands (MRCs), each overseeing operations in specific geographic areas. Elite units such as the Presidential Protection Brigades and the Mobile Region intervene in critical zones, supported by specialized aerospace and naval units,
e. A parallel “supervisory system” exists, with supervisors (mushrif) appointed for each governorate and ministry, reporting directly to the Houthi leadership. These supervisors often come from families with close kinship ties to the core Houthi leadership.
2. Branches and Locations
a. The Houthis control most of northern Yemen, including the capital Sana’a, and maintain a presence in key governorates such as Saada, Al Jawf, Marib, Dhamar, Al Bayda, Hajjah, Taiz, and Hodeidah,
b. Their security apparatus includes: Preventive Security (internal surveillance and discipline). Security and Intelligence Bureau (merged intelligence services). Zainabiyat (female intelligence and enforcement unit).
c. The movement has established new institutions to control revenue and humanitarian aid, such as the General Authority of Islamic Alms and the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
3. Strength of Units
a. As of 2025, estimates suggest the Houthis have around 350,000 fighters, a significant increase from previous years, making them one of the most formidable non-state military forces in the region.
b. The force structure is highly decentralized at the tactical level. Frontline units are often small, autonomous cells (3–5 fighters), designed for mobility and to blend in with civilian populations.
c. Elite and specialized units, such as missile forces and UAV operators, are tightly controlled and often operate under direct supervision from trusted commanders.
4. Key Organizational Features
a. Basij-style brigades: Parallel mobilization reserves (Logistics and Support Brigades) modeled after Iran’s Basij, focusing on indoctrination and rapid deployment.
b. Geographic dispersion: Forces are concentrated along the Red Sea coast (critical for maritime attacks), central Yemen, and the northern border with Saudi Arabia.
c. Integrated militias: Tribal fighters and locally recruited forces form the backbone, organized under a centralized command structure.
5. Military Capabilities
a. Ballistic missiles (e.g., Typhoon, a variant of the Iranian Qadr, with ranges up to 1,900 km).
b. Cruise missiles and drones (including Samad-3, Qasef-1, Sammad UAVs, and others).
c. Indigenous production capabilities for missiles and UAVs, with technical support from Iran and Hezbollah.
d. Anti-aircraft systems, including MANPADS, which have downed coalition aircraft and drones.
e. Their military strength is bolstered by alliances with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, providing financial, logistical, and technical support.
PART IV GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE, CIVIL AFFAIRS
1. Geography
a. The Houthi strongholds in Yemen, particularly in the northwestern governorate of Sa’dah and surrounding areas, are characterized by rugged mountainous terrain that has historically provided strategic advantages.
b. This region, part of Yemen’s northern highlands, features steep valleys, rocky outcrops, and difficult-to-navigate landscapes, which the Houthis have leveraged to evade airstrikes and wage cross-border attacks.
c. The mountainous terrain in Sa’dah and border areas like Amran allows for concealed movement, hidden weapon stockpiles, and guerrilla-style operations, complicating ground offensives and aerial targeting.
2. Climate
a. Weather patterns in these regions are typical of arid and semi-arid mountainous zones, with hot, dry conditions dominating much of the year. Temperatures can vary significantly between day and night, particularly in higher elevations.
b. While specific weather details during recent conflicts are not explicitly documented in available reports, the desert climate suggests minimal rainfall, contributing to dusty, low-visibility conditions that could further challenge military operations.
c. The combination of hostile terrain and harsh weather has historically amplified the Houthis’ defensive capabilities, enabling prolonged resistance against Saudi-led coalition forces and others.
3. Civil Affairs
a. Over 21.6 million Yemenis (including 11 million children) require urgent aid due to food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and displacement.
b. Houthi-controlled areas face restrictions on humanitarian access, with unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles imposed on aid organizations, exacerbating shortages of medicine and fuel.
c. The Houthis have consolidated authoritarian rule, brutally suppressing civil society through arbitrary detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances. They enforce strict social controls, particularly targeting women and religious minorities, while maintaining dominance over key institutions in Sanaa and northern Yemen.
d. The war has devastated Yemen's economy, with infrastructure destruction and blockade-related shortages causing widespread poverty. The 2022 UN-brokered truce briefly eased fuel imports and flights from Sanaa, but economic recovery remains stalled amid ongoing instability.
e. The Houthis reject federalist proposals and demand autonomy for their northern stronghold of Saada. Their exclusion of women, southern separatists (STC), and minority groups from peace talks undermines prospects for an inclusive settlement.
f. The population endures a protection crisis, with all warring parties committing rights violations, including Saudi border forces massacring migrants.
4. Religion
a. Sunni Islam (Shafi'i school): Estimates range from 55% to 65% of the population.
(1) Predominantly in the south and southeast.
b. Zaydi Shia Islam: Estimates vary between 34% and 45%.
(1) Concentrated in the north and northwest.
c. Christians (estimates range from about 1,000 to as high as 40,000, though most do not publicly identify due to fear of persecution).
d. Others include small populations of Christians and Jews.
5. Psychological-Media Warfare
a. Both the Houthis and the internationally recognized government have systematically targeted independent and opposition media, replacing them with outlets that serve their own narratives.
b. Media outlets are highly polarized, each side focusing on the atrocities of their opponents while downplaying or ignoring their own, which deepens antagonism and regionalism among the population.
c. Social media and digital platforms have become critical battlegrounds. Misinformation, disinformation, hate speech, and extremist content are widespread, fueling sectarian and regional divisions and undermining trust in any peace process.
d. The deliberate manipulation of information and the use of propaganda are central elements of psychological warfare in Yemen. By controlling narratives and spreading misinformation, warring parties aim to demoralize opponents, rally their own supporters, and deepen divisions within society.
e. Control of the narrative, dissemination of propaganda, and deliberate polarization have become powerful tools for all sides, inflicting lasting psychological harm on the population and complicating efforts for peace and recovery.
PART V CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
1. 2014-2016
a. September 2014: Houthi rebels, allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s forces, seize control of Sanaa, forcing President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to negotiate a power-sharing agreement. Government collapse: Hadi’s administration resigns under pressure, granting the Houthis unprecedented political influence.
b. March-April 2015: Houthis capture key southern cities, including parts of Aden, prompting Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia launches a military coalition (including UAE, Egypt, and others) against the Houthis, initiating airstrikes and a blockade. Pro-Hadi forces, backed by coalition airstrikes, recapture Aden and parts of Lahij Governorate.
c. April-October 2016: Saudi-led coalition retakes Mukalla from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Mass demonstrations in Sanaa show support for the Houthi-Saleh alliance. Houthis attack a UAE ship with a missile, escalating Red Sea tensions.
d. 2017-2018: Saleh breaks from the Houthi alliance and is killed shortly after. Coalition-backed forces launch an offensive to capture Hodeidah, a critical port city, triggering widespread humanitarian concerns.
e. 2019-2021: Southern Transitional Council (STC), UAE-backed separatists, seize Aden from Hadi’s government, fracturing the anti-Houthi coalition. UN-brokered Stockholm Agreement fails to fully halt fighting in Hodeidah. Houthis escalate attacks on Marib, a government stronghold, and Saudi infrastructure.
f. 2022-2025: Temporary UN-mediated truce reduces violence, but collapses after six months. Houthis strengthen control in northern Yemen while engaging in peace talks with Saudi Arabia. Houthis capture Al Jawf Governorate’s capital, Al Hazm, amid ongoing clashes. Houthis continue targeting international shipping, drawing U.S.-led counterstrikes.
PART VI SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Table 1: Allied Numerical Strength (Approximate)
| Asset Type | Estimated Numbers/Details |
|---|---|
| Aircraft Carriers | 2 (USS Eisenhower, USS Truman) |
| Carrier Aircraft | 140–180 (across both carriers) |
| Drones | Multiple MQ-9 Reapers |
| Strike Aircraft | F/A-18s, Typhoon FGR4s (exact numbers not public) |
| Naval Vessels | Multiple (exact numbers not public) |
| Personnel | Thousands (carrier crews + air wings) |
| Ground Troops | None reported |
Table 2: Operation Poseidon Archer
| Component | Details |
|---|---|
| Lead Nations | United States, United Kingdom |
| Supporting Partners | Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand |
| Naval Assets | Destroyers, cruisers, submarines, aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower |
| Air Assets | F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, RAF Typhoon jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones |
| Munitions Used | Tomahawk cruise missiles, Paveway IV bombs, precision-guided munitions |
| Target Types | Static (infrastructure, radars), Mobile (missile launchers, UAVs, USVs, UUVs) |
| Operational Focus | Precision strikes to degrade Houthi maritime threat, minimize escalation |
| Legal Basis | UN Security Council Resolution 2722 |
| Results | Substantial reduction in Houthi attacks, degraded Houthi capabilities |
Table 3: Houthi Organizational Overview
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Leadership | Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (overall leader), Mahdi al-Mashat (political head) |
| Political Organ | Supreme Political Council, Political Bureau |
| Military Structure | Military Regional Commands, elite units, parallel supervisory system |
| Security Branches | Preventive Security, Security & Intelligence Bureau, Zainabiyat |
| Locations | Northern Yemen (Sana’a, Saada, Al Jawf, Marib, etc.) |
| Estimated Strength | ~350,000 fighters |
| Unit Structure | Small autonomous cells (3–5 fighters), elite/specialized units |
| Capabilities | Ballistic/cruise missiles, drones, MANPADS, indigenous arms production |
| External Support | Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas |
Data: Perplexity AI
Image: https://www.robertharding.com/preview/1131-2024/camel-caravan-sandstorm-desert-ai-generated-middle-east/
Report prepared by JCL, Pvt. USMC (212xxxx-2533) Radio Communications, 27th Regt. Landing Team (RLT) HQ, Duong Son 2, RVN (AT998678).
JTF-SB 2025
3/LRC/cr1/5750
CMCC NR _____3______
Ser. No. 040-25
COPY _1__ OF __10__COPIES
April 2025
End of Report
CLASSIFIED