Sub Unit One (-) Rein.
Office of Operational Security
FPO SFO 90001
From: Lt.Cmdr. XO, SU001, T-Branch
To: CNO, Echelon Alpha, Norfolk, VA
Subj: Status, Carrier Mishap, Red Sea, 04.28.25
CLASSIFIED
Encl. (1) Submitted for review, cleared fwd channels.
CVN-75--Ghost in the Radar--Spoofing an Aircraft Carrier
PART I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS
PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
PART I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
1. USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75)
a. Capt. Dave Snowden: Served as commanding officer from December 2023 until his relief on February 20, 2025, following a collision with the merchant vessel Besiktas-M near Port Said, Egypt.
b. Capt. Christopher Hill: Previously commanding officer of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), became the interim commanding officer of Truman following Snowden's relief. Hill assumed this role while Eisenhower undergoes maintenance.
c. ExecOff: Capt. Tom Uhl. Needs verification.
(Note: A CVN-75 website still shows Capt. Snowden as commander. See: PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS).
2. Carrier Wing One (CVW-1) No available data on command.
3. Administration Department:
a. Handles service records, leave processing, reenlistments, and career counseling for over 3,000 crewmembers.
4. Air Department:
a. Largest department (600+ personnel).
b. Operates catapults, arresting gear, and aircraft fueling systems.
c. Manages flight deck and hangar bay safety.
5. Combat Systems:
a. Maintains radar, communications, GPS, and network security.
b. Manages weapons systems and electronic warfare.
6. Deck Department:
a. Handles anchors, shipboard ceremonies, and traditional seamanship.
b. Includes Boatswain’s Mates (oldest Navy rating).
7. Navigation:
a. Uses GPS, radar, and traditional tools (sextants, paper charts) for safe ship movement.
8. Operations:
a. Plans missions and exercises.
b. Manages air traffic control and tactical engagement systems (Combat Direction Center).
PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY
1. On 28 April 2025, the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) lost an F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter jet and a tow tractor overboard during operations in the Red Sea.
a. The incident occurred while the aircraft was being towed in the hangar bay, with the move crew losing control of the jet during the carrier’s evasive maneuvers to avoid suspected Houthi threats.
2. Cause: Preliminary reports suggest the carrier’s sharp turn-likely in response to incoming Houthi drone or missile fire-contributed to the loss of control.
a. The Navy’s official statement did not confirm a direct link to enemy action but acknowledged the aircraft was lost during towing.
3. Casualties: All personnel were accounted for, with one sailor sustaining minor injuries.
4. Aircraft Status: The $56–$60 million jet (reports vary) and tow tractor sank into the Red Sea.
5. Context: The Houthis claimed responsibility for targeting the Truman earlier that day, citing retaliation for U.S. strikes in Yemen.
6. Investigation: The Navy launched an inquiry into the mishap, emphasizing operational safety protocols.
PART III. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Hypothetical scenario for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) encountering a false missile threat due to radar error on April 28, 2025, synthesized from operational patterns and technical vulnerabilities identified in available information:
1. Scenario: Radar Ducting Creates False Missile Signature
a. Date/Time: April 28, 2025 (midday, Red Sea).
b. Conditions: Temperature inversion layer creates radar ducting.
c. High humidity, sea clutter.
2. Radar Anomaly Detection
a. Truman's AN/SPS-48E radar detects a low-altitude, high-speed contact approaching at 600 knots from the southwest.
b. Atmospheric ducting refracts radar waves, creating a false echo that mimics a sea-skimming cruise missile's signature.
3. Electronic Warfare Confusion
a. The ship's SLQ-32(V)4 electronic warfare suite fails to classify the contact as hostile or friendly due to distorted signal propagation.
b. Nearby merchant vessel radar emissions (unintentionally amplified by ducting) compound the ambiguity.
4. Crisis Response Activation
a. 06:30 Local: Battle stations manned, CIWS systems activated.
b. 06:32: F/A-18E Super Hornet (VFA-136) on deck loses securing during evasive maneuvers, sliding into the sea as Truman executes a hard 35° turn at 30+ knots.
c. 06:34: AEGIS destroyers USS Stout (DDG-55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109) attempt verification but struggle with shared radar distortion.
5. Aftermath
a. 06:40: Contact disappears - determined to be radar ghost from a weather balloon caught in ducting layer.
b. Casualties: Aircraft lost (similar to April 29 real-world incident.
c. Strategic Impact: 24-hour operational pause while CENTCOM investigates radar performance in anomalous conditions.
B. Structured hypothesis for the CVN-75 radar issues on April 28, 2025, incorporating electronic warfare and environmental factors:
1. Low-Altitude Missile/Drone Threat
a. A potential Houthi/Iranian-supplied cruise missile (e.g., Quds-4) or drone flying at low altitude could exploit radar clutter from sea waves, reducing detection range.
b. The Truman's AEGIS-equipped escorts might have been affected by radar ducting-atmospheric layers trapping radar waves, creating skip zones.
2. Jamming/Deception Tactics
a. Spoofed Navigation Signals: Adversaries could have exploited vulnerabilities in SATCOM or AIS (as highlighted in the March 10 collision analysis), feeding false positional data to the strike group.
b. GPS Jamming: Iranian electronic warfare assets (e.g., radar ships or commercial vessels) might have disrupted GPS-dependent systems, affecting radar correlation with real-time positioning.
3. Sensor Degradation
a. False Returns: Weather conditions (e.g., sea spray, temperature inversions) or biological interference (e.g., bird swarms) could generate phantom radar contacts, diverting attention from actual threats.
b. Shadowing/Reflections: Nearby merchant vessels or the Truman’s own superstructure might have created blind spots, masking inbound threats.
4. Human-System Interaction Failure
a. Overreliance on Automation: Bridge crews might have prioritized electronic readouts over visual confirmation, mirroring the March 10 collision where compromised systems overrode human judgment.
a. Fatigue/Procedural Gaps: High operational tempo in contested waters could lead to lapses in manual radar cross-verification protocols.
5. Scenario Reconstruction
a. A cruise missile/drone approaching at wave-top altitude might have been masked by clutter, while jamming degraded AEGIS radar fidelity.
b. The Truman’s sudden evasive turn-potentially based on conflicting sensor data-led to the Super Hornet’s loss overboard.
c. The absence of confirmed debris or missile intercepts suggests either a false radar track (e.g., atmospheric anomaly) or a successful electronic deception preventing proper threat classification.
PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS
The USS Harry S. Truman’s loss of an F/A-18E Super Hornet and tow tractor on April 28, 2025, has drawn scrutiny from press and social media, focusing on conflicting narratives and operational risks. Key points of skepticism include:
1. Discrepancy in Official vs. Unofficial Accounts
a. The Navy’s official statement attributes the loss to a loss of control during towing in the hangar bay.
b. Multiple defense sources and media outlets, including CNN, cite preliminary reports suggesting the carrier executed a sharp evasive maneuver to avoid Houthi fire, contributing to the mishap.
c. This discrepancy has fueled speculation about the Navy’s transparency regarding operational threats.
2. Operational Context and Houthi Threats
a. The incident occurred amid intensified Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and U.S. naval assets, including recent claims by the group of targeting the Truman.
b. Social media commentators question whether evasive actions-such as the described “zig-zag” maneuvers causing significant ship tilt.
c. Compromised deck safety, a concern amplified by the $60–70 million loss.
3. Investigation and Accountability
a. While the Navy has initiated an investigation the lack of immediate details about recovery efforts or corrective measures has drawn criticism. b. Media outlets emphasize the absence of clarity on whether the aircraft was armed or if recovery is feasible.
4. Social Media Reactions
a. Platforms like Instagram and Twitter/X highlight concerns over the Navy’s initial injury reports (later clarified to one minor injury) and echo skepticism about the adequacy of current protocols and echo skepticism about the adequacy of current protocols for securing aircraft during evasive maneuvers.
b. Memes and commentary often juxtapose the carrier’s agility with the vulnerability of its deck operations.
PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Radar Spoofing
Radar spoofing is an electronic countermeasure technique designed to deceive radar systems by generating false target signals. Here's a structured breakdown:
a. Core Concept: Spoofing involves creating fake radar echoes to mislead operators or automated systems into detecting non-existent targets or misidentifying real ones.
b. Signal Replay: Attackers record incoming radar pulses and retransmit them with delays or frequency shifts to alter perceived target distance or velocity.
c. False Echo Generation: Systems synthesize multiple fake echoes with randomized spacing to overload radar processors and mask real targets.
d. Synchronization Challenges: Effective spoofing requires precise timing (e.g., matching radar pulse repetition intervals) to avoid detection by anomaly-checking algorithms.
2. Technical Analysis of Failure Modes
Factor Contribution to Error
a. Atmospheric Ducting: Trapped radar waves created false low-altitude corridor.
b. Sea Clutter High sea state increased false positive risk for low-flying targets.
c. EW Limitations SLQ-32 unable to resolve spoofed signature amidst distorted returns.
d. Human Factors Stress-induced confirmation bias during high-tempo response.
3. Supporting Evidence Table
Factor Evidence from Incidents Relevance to April 28 Event
a. Radar Clutter Waves/spray caused false returns in historical naval accidents Explains potential failure to distinguish low-flying missile from sea clutter
b. Jamming Iranian radar ships actively support Houthi targeting SATCOM/AIS vulnerabilities previously exploited in March collision
c. Atmospheric Effects Radar ducting documented in Red Sea operations Skip zones could hide inbound threats from AEGIS systems
d. Human Error Hierarchical bridge culture cited in March collision Similar pressure to trust automated systems during evasive maneuvers
4. CVN-75 Website: (Unconfirmed if official)
https://www.ussharrystrumanfoundation.org/truman-leadership
Data recovery: Perplexity AI, media primary sources.
Image: https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2020/april/sonar-sea-services
Report prepared by:
JCL, USMC, (212xxxx-2533), RadioComm, RLT- 27. BaseDef., 3MarDiv.
END OF REPORT//CLASSIFIED