PAHALGAM--India.Pakistan--Cyberwarfare Intelligence Brief

HEADQUARTERS

Sub Unit Alpha (-) (Rein)

Cmd., OP, Cyberwarfare Div.

FPO LT CA 900xx

From.  CTCT, RLT-27

To.       CMG, 1MarDiv, (-Rein)

Subj.    Status, Cyberwarfare, India.Pakistan.

02 May 2025

Encl. (1) Submitted herewith, rf. 5750.7 Zulu.

CLASSIFIED

PART I.  ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. India

1. India's Primary Cyber Defense Agencies

          a.  CERT-In

                    (1)  Role: National nodal agency for cybersecurity incident response, issuing alerts, and coordinating best practices.

                    (2) Focus: Non-critical infrastructure protection, threat analysis, and collaboration with international agencies.

          b. NCIIPC

                    (1)  Role: Safeguards Critical Information Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, financial systems) under Section 70A of the IT Act.

                    (2)  Focus: Prevents debilitating attacks on national security and economic stability.

          c.  Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA)

                    (1)  Role: Military cyber operations, including offensive/defensive actions against state-sponsored threats (e.g., Pakistan, China).

                    (2)  Structure: Tri-services unit under the Ministry of Defence, led by a two-star officer.

          d.  National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC)

                    (1)  Role: Real-time cyber threat monitoring and strategic coordination across agencies.

2.  Oversight & Policy

          a.  National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS): 

                    (1)  Provides strategic direction and coordinates cybersecurity policies across ministries.

          b.  Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA): 

                    (1)  Handles cybercrime and implements content restrictions.

          c.  Ministry of Electronics & IT (MeitY): 

                    (1)  Supports CERT-In and manages non-military cybersecurity frameworks.

B. Pakistan

1. Core Government Entities

          a.  PKCERT: 

                    (1)  The National Cyber Emergency Response Team handles threat detection, incident response, and policy development while collaborating with international CERTs.

          b.  NCCS: 

                    (1) The National Centre for Cyber Security coordinates R&D labs across 11 universities, focusing on forensics, IoT security, and critical infrastructure protection.

2.  Key Private-Sector Players

          a.  Secure Networks: 

                    (1)  Provides solutions like penetration testing, compliance audits, and network security for businesses and government bodies.

          b.  Apprise Cyber: 

                    (1)  Offers penetration testing, ISO 27001 implementation, and security training with 15+ years of expertise.

          c.  IdealSols: 

                    (1)  Delivers threat intelligence and vulnerability assessments through its Pakistan-based teams.

3.  Collaborative Framework

          a.  Academia-Industry Links: 

                    (1)  NCCS labs (e.g., Air University’s forensics lab) partner with global research institutes and local firms like those listed on Clutch (e.g., Ebryx, Rewterz).

          b.  Capacity Building: 

                    (1) PKCERT runs national cyber drills, awareness campaigns, and technical training programs.

                    (2) NCCS advances applied research in malware analysis and blockchain security.

4.  This network combines policy enforcement (PKCERT), innovation (NCCS), and private-sector implementation (Secure Networks, Apprise Cyber) to address evolving threats. 

 PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack (22 April 2025), India has faced a coordinated cyber offensive linked to Pakistan-based groups, characterized by website defacements, phishing campaigns, and psychological warfare tactics:

1.  Scale & Coordination:

          a.  Nearly 1 million cyberattacks were recorded within 8 days, involving collaboration between groups like Team Insane PK (Pakistan), Mysterious Team Bangladesh, and Moroccan Dragon.

2.  Key Incidents

          a.  Rajasthan Education Department: 

                    (1)  Defaced by "Pakistan Cyber Force" with messages alleging the Pahalgam attack was an "inside job" and threatening "bytes over bullets."

          b.  Army College of Nursing: 

                    (1)  Hacked by Team Insane PK, displaying images of the Pahalgam attack and militant Burhan Wani.

          c.  Armed Forces Websites: 

                    (1)  Attempted breaches of Army Public Schools (Srinagar/Ranikhet), welfare portals, and Air Force databases.

3.  Tactics & Tools:

          a.  Phishing: 

                    (1)  Malicious PDFs mimicking official reports on Pahalgam circulated to harvest data.

          b.  Malware: 

                   (1)  CrimsonRAT and MeshAgent deployed via targeted emails.

          c.  Psychological Messaging: 

                    (1)  Hackers emphasized religious divides ("Muslims vs. Hindus") and referenced past conflicts (e.g., Abhinandan Varthaman's capture).

PART III. SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL ASPECTS

 Cyber Defense Operations. India’s cyber restrictions against Pakistan are managed through a coordinated effort involving multiple agencies:

          a. National Cybersecurity Architecture: 

                    (1) National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC).

                    (2) Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), detected and neutralized cyberattacks on military-affiliated websites (Army Public Schools, AWHO, IAF Placement Portal) in real time.

                    (3) Military Cyber Units: Specialized teams under the Defence Cyber Agency isolated compromised sites, traced attacks to Pakistan-based hackers (e.g., “IOK Hacker”), and implemented restorative measures.

          b. Content and Access Restrictions

                    (1) Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA): Recommended blocking Pakistani YouTube channels and websites disseminating anti-India content.

                    (2) Department of Telecommunications (DoT): Likely involved in enforcing IP address blocks and coordinating with ISPs to restrict access to Pakistani websites.

          c. Intelligence Coordination

                    (1) Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research & Analysis Wing (RAW): Provided assessments attributing cyberattacks to Pakistan-based actors.

PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS

The international press and social media reactions to cyber warfare and restrictions following the Pahalgam attack highlight escalating tensions and digital conflict:

1.  Cyber Warfare

          a.  Scale of Attacks: Over 1 million cyberattacks targeted Indian systems post-attack, attributed to groups from Pakistan, the Middle East, Indonesia, and Morocco.

2.  State-Linked Campaigns:

          a.  APT36 (Pakistan-linked) used phishing decoys themed on the attack to target Indian government/defense personnel via fake domains mimicking official entities like Jammu & Kashmir Police.

          b.  Pro-India hackers breached Pakistani government databases (e.g., AJK Supreme Court, Sindh Police), while Pakistani groups defaced Indian sites, including the Army College of Nursing.

3.  Geopolitical Strategy: 

          a.  Cybersecurity experts warned such attacks are now a "geopolitical tool," with phishing domains mimicking Indian government sites to spread malware.

4.  International Press Coverage

          a.  Escalation Focus: Outlets like CNN and Al Jazeera emphasized the attack’s role in cratering India-Pakistan relations, with cyber conflict compounding traditional military tensions.

          b.  Human Impact: Graphic social media posts of victims circulated widely, amplifying global scrutiny of Kashmir’s security situation.

5.  Social Media Dynamics

          a.  Disinformation Risks: Phishing PDFs and fake domains exploited public outrage, leveraging the attack’s emotive impact to infiltrate systems.

          b.  Hacktivist Messaging: Defaced websites included ideological statements (e.g., religious polarization), mirroring rhetoric from Pakistani military leadership.

PART V.  SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Key sources detailing India-Pakistan cyberwarfare developments following the Pahalgam attack:

1.  Firstpost Analysis

          a.  Reports Pakistan-based hackers defaced the Indian Army College of Nursing website on April 25 with inflammatory messages, part of Islamabad's "psychological warfare."

                    (1) Experts warn such attacks are now "extensions of geopolitical strategy" and likely to escalate.

2.  India TV News

          a.  Documents cross-border cyber campaigns:

                    (1)  Indian hacktivists targeted Pakistani government/private entities like AJK Supreme Court and Sindh Police.

                    (2)  Pakistan-linked groups deployed phishing domains mimicking Indian government sites and distributed malicious PDFs.

3.  Academic Context

          a.  JDSS Journal (Jan 2025) analyzes how cyber capabilities are now integrated into nuclearized rivalries, risking critical infrastructure disruption.

          b.  Sage Journal (April 2025) highlights cyberweapons' strategic role in modern conflicts like India-Pakistan tensions.

4.  Government Responses

          a.  Indian officials claim to have thwarted state-backed Pakistani attacks targeting defense, government systems, and critical infrastructure since the attack.

5. International sources and social media.

6.  Synthetic intelligence query:  Perplexity AI

Image: https://openart.ai/community/Frd1FZvURq4kGXvRCvrr

Report prepared by. J-Charlie.Lima. (204xxxx-2533).tbranch. Ctct.

CLASSIFIED

End.of.Report.

PAHALGAM--India.Pakistan--Digital Warfare Brief

HEADQUARTERS

RLT Two.Seven, (Rein), FMF
FPO, SFO, CA 900xx

01 May 2025

From:     CO, Sub Unit Alpha, CommSect1
To:          CG, 1MarDiv (-) (Rein)
Subj.       Digital Counterstrikes, India.Pakistan.

 
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2B

CLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION: "Special": S&C (2); Div (8)

PAHALGAM--India.Pakistan--Digital Warfare Brief

PART I.     ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II.    NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III.   SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV.   SEQUENTIAL ASPECTS 

PART V.     CIVIL AFFAIRS

PART VI.   SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 

PART I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

     India has implemented a series of digital restrictions targeting Pakistani social media accounts following the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, which killed 26 tourists. These measures include blocking Instagram accounts of prominent Pakistani actors and artists, banning Pakistani YouTube channels, and restricting access to content deemed a threat to national security.

1. Key actions taken by India:

          a.  Instagram account blocks: 

                    (1)  Accounts of Pakistani actors including Mahira Khan, Hania Aamir, Ali Zafar, Sajal Aly, and others were restricted in India, displaying messages citing compliance with legal requests tied to national security.

2. YouTube channel bans: 

                    (1)  India blocked 16 Pakistani YouTube channels, including major news outlets like Dawn News, Geo News, and personal channels of figures such as former cricketer Shoaib Akhtar, for spreading "provocative and communally sensitive content."

3. Military-linked restrictions: 

                    (1)  The YouTube channel of Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military's media wing, was also blocked in India.

PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

     Following the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, which killed 26 people (mostly tourists), India imposed significant digital restrictions targeting Pakistani media and communication channels as part of its retaliatory measures.

1. YouTube Channel Bans

          a.  India blocked access to 16+ Pakistani YouTube channels, including major outlets like Dawn News, Geo TV, ARY News, and Samaa TV, accusing them of spreading anti-India propaganda and fake narratives related to the attack.

     b. Social Media Platform Pressure

                    (1) The Indian government urged platforms like Instagram and X (Twitter) to ban Pakistani accounts, leading to reported restrictions on handles linked to Pakistani celebrities (e.g., Hania Aamir, Mahira Khan) and media entities.

                    (2)  This formed part of a broader strategy to counter what India called Pakistan’s “institutionalized information warfare.”

3. Justification and Context

          a.  The measures were framed as a digital counterstrike to disrupt Pakistan’s alleged disinformation campaigns, which India claims aim to destabilize its social fabric during crises.

          b.  The bans targeted channels accused of promoting Kashmir militancy narratives and downplaying Pakistan’s alleged role in the Pahalgam attack.

4. Brother Escalatory Measures

          a. These digital restrictions accompanied other punitive actions, including border closures, visa suspensions, and the expulsion of Pakistani diplomats.

          b.  India’s move to block ISPR’s channel marked a direct strike on Pakistan’s military-media apparatus.

          c.  The digital crackdown reflects India’s shift toward hybrid warfare tactics, combining military, diplomatic, and information-domain responses to cross-border terrorism.

PART III. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

     India's digital counterstrikes against Pakistan have become a critical component of national security strategy, particularly following the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam terror attack that killed 27 civilians.

1.  Content Blocking and Platform Bans

          a.  India banned 17 Pakistani YouTube channels (including Dawn, Geo News, and former cricketer Shoaib Akhtar's account) with over 63 million combined subscribers.

                    (1) Role in spreading "provocative, communally sensitive content and false narratives" about India's military.

                   (2) The government also restricted X (Twitter) accounts of Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif and ISI-linked journalists for promoting terrorism-related disinformation.

2.  Cyber Attack Mitigation

          a.  Security agencies thwarted coordinated cyber assaults on critical infrastructure, including:

                    (1)  Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on Army Public Schools in Srinagar and Ranikhet.

                    (2)  Breach attempts against the Army Welfare Housing Organization database.

                    (3) Compromise efforts targeting airport management. systems

3.  Encrypted Platform Crackdown

          a.  India is investigating ProtonMail and Alpha Mail for enabling terror communications through end-to-end encryption, particularly after links to fake bomb threats emerged.

4.  Strategic Cyber Posture

          a.  The countermeasures align with India's evolving cyber warfare doctrine, which prioritizes:

                    (1)  Preemptive takedowns of hostile digital assets.

                    (2)  Active defense of military/civilian networks.

                    (3)  International exposure of Pakistan's state-sponsored cyber-terror nexus, as demonstrated at the UN.

                    (4) Dedicated cyber units like NTRO coordinate these efforts, mirroring Pakistan's ISI-linked cyber warfare infrastructure.

5.  These actions reflect India's shift toward asymmetric digital deterrence in response to Pakistan's nuclear-constrained conventional warfare tactics.

          a.  Cyber operations now constituting a frontline national security mechanism against cross-border threats.

PART IV. TECHNICAL ASPECTS

     Following the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, India's digital countermeasures against Pakistan focused on cyber defense, content moderation, and attribution tracking, with no confirmed reports of offensive cyber operations. Key technical aspects include:

1. Defensive Cybersecurity Operations

          a.  Thwarted Cyberattacks: Indian authorities neutralized multiple coordinated attempts by Pakistan-based hackers targeting military-linked websites, including:

                    (1) Army Public Schools in Srinagar and Ranikhet (DDoS attacks and front-page defacements).

                    (2)  Indian Air Force Placement Cell and Army Welfare Housing Organization (attempted data breaches).

           b.  Incident Response:

                    (1) Isolation and Restoration: Affected websites were promptly disconnected, cleaned, and restored.

                    (2) Zero Operational Impact: No classified military networks or sensitive databases were compromised.

2. Attribution and Tracking

          a.  Hacker Identification: The IO Kilafa group (linked to Pakistani intelligence) was identified as the primary actor behind the attacks.

          b.  Tactical Patterns:  Targeted public-facing military portals to harvest personnel data or disrupt services.

          c.  Used distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and web defacement tools to spread propaganda (e.g., displaying Pakistani flags and anti-India messages).

3. Legal Framework:

          a.  Invoked Section 69A of the IT Act to issue takedown orders.

          b.  Compliance enforced through intermediary guidelines for platforms like YouTube.

4. Enhanced Cyber Posture

          a.  Network Hardening: Military cyber units prioritized securing publicly accessible endpoints and welfare portals to prevent data leaks.

          b.  Real-Time Monitoring: Deployed advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) to flag suspicious activity linked to Pakistani IP clusters.

5.  Key Differences from Past Responses

          a.  While India conducted kinetic strikes after the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, the 2025 response emphasized cyber resilience and information warfare mitigation, reflecting a shift toward hybrid conflict management. 

          b.  No evidence of offensive cyber operations (e.g., grid disruptions or data-wiping malware) has been reported.

PART V. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. International Media Coverage

          a.  While the provided sources focus on Indian media reports and government actions, international outlets like Al Jazeera highlighted local Kashmiri politicians criticizing security crackdowns post-attack.

                    (1)  Specific international reactions to the digital restrictions remain unclear from available data.

2.  Social Media Reactions

          a.  Indian Social Media: Users expressed frustration over losing access to popular Pakistani dramas and celebrities' accounts, with fans of shows like Humsafar and Zindagi Gulzar Hai voicing disappointment on platforms like X (Twitter).

          b.  Pakistani Response: Islamabad retaliated by shutting airspace to Indian flights and halting trade.

          c.  Direct social media reactions from Pakistani users or officials (beyond blocked accounts) are not detailed in the sources.

3.  Platform Compliance: 

          a.  Instagram and YouTube displayed messages citing legal compliance for restricting content in India, including notices like "Account not available in India" for celebrities such as Mahira Khan and Hania Aamir.

4.  Notable Gaps

          a.  The search results lack explicit mentions of statements from global human rights organizations or tech companies (beyond compliance notes), indicating a potential area for further investigation into broader international discourse.

PART VI. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Data recovery provided by media news sources and AI queries: Perplexity.

Image: https://stock.adobe.com/it/search?k=female+hacker

Report prepared by: J-Charlie.Lima, (204xxxx-2533), SU-ALPHA.

CLASSIFIED

End of Brief.

CVN-75--Ghost in the Radar--Spoofing an Aircraft Carrier

HEADQUARTERS
Sub Unit One (-) Rein.

Office of Operational Security

FPO SFO 90001

From:   Lt.Cmdr. XO, SU001, T-Branch

To:        CNO, Echelon Alpha, Norfolk, VA

Subj:     Status, Carrier Mishap, Red Sea, 04.28.25

CLASSIFIED

Encl. (1) Submitted for review, cleared fwd channels.

CVN-75--Ghost in the Radar--Spoofing an Aircraft Carrier

PART I.   ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II.  NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

PART IV.  CIVIL AFFAIRS

PART V.   SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

PART I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1.  USS Harry S. Truman  (CVN-75)

          a.  Capt. Dave Snowden: Served as commanding officer from December 2023 until his relief on February 20, 2025, following a collision with the merchant vessel Besiktas-M near Port Said, Egypt.

          b.  Capt. Christopher Hill: Previously commanding officer of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), became the interim commanding officer of Truman following Snowden's relief. Hill assumed this role while Eisenhower undergoes maintenance.

          c. ExecOff: Capt. Tom Uhl. Needs verification. 

(Note: A CVN-75 website still shows Capt. Snowden as commander. See: PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS).

2.  Carrier Wing One (CVW-1) No available data on command.

3.  Administration Department:  

          a.  Handles service records, leave processing, reenlistments, and career counseling for over 3,000 crewmembers. 

4.  Air Department:

          a.  Largest department (600+ personnel).

          b.  Operates catapults, arresting gear, and aircraft fueling systems.

          c.  Manages flight deck and hangar bay safety.

5.  Combat Systems:

          a.  Maintains radar, communications, GPS, and network security.

          b.  Manages weapons systems and electronic warfare.

6.  Deck Department:

          a.  Handles anchors, shipboard ceremonies, and traditional seamanship.

          b.  Includes Boatswain’s Mates (oldest Navy rating).

7.  Navigation: 

          a.  Uses GPS, radar, and traditional tools (sextants, paper charts) for safe ship movement.

8.  Operations:

          a.  Plans missions and exercises.

          b.  Manages air traffic control and tactical engagement systems (Combat Direction Center).

PART II. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1.  On 28 April 2025, the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) lost an F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter jet and a tow tractor overboard during operations in the Red Sea. 

          a.  The incident occurred while the aircraft was being towed in the hangar bay, with the move crew losing control of the jet during the carrier’s evasive maneuvers to avoid suspected Houthi threats.

2.  Cause: Preliminary reports suggest the carrier’s sharp turn-likely in response to incoming Houthi drone or missile fire-contributed to the loss of control. 

          a.  The Navy’s official statement did not confirm a direct link to enemy action but acknowledged the aircraft was lost during towing.

3.  Casualties: All personnel were accounted for, with one sailor sustaining minor injuries.

4.  Aircraft Status: The $56–$60 million jet (reports vary) and tow tractor sank into the Red Sea.

5.  Context: The Houthis claimed responsibility for targeting the Truman earlier that day, citing retaliation for U.S. strikes in Yemen.

6.  Investigation: The Navy launched an inquiry into the mishap, emphasizing operational safety protocols.

PART III. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

  A.  Hypothetical scenario for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) encountering a false missile threat due to radar error on April 28, 2025, synthesized from operational patterns and technical vulnerabilities identified in available information:

1. Scenario: Radar Ducting Creates False Missile Signature

          a.  Date/Time: April 28, 2025 (midday, Red Sea).

          b.  Conditions: Temperature inversion layer creates radar ducting.

          c.  High humidity, sea clutter.

2.  Radar Anomaly Detection

          a.  Truman's AN/SPS-48E radar detects a low-altitude, high-speed contact approaching at 600 knots from the southwest.

          b.  Atmospheric ducting refracts radar waves, creating a false echo that mimics a sea-skimming cruise missile's signature.

3.  Electronic Warfare Confusion

          a.  The ship's SLQ-32(V)4 electronic warfare suite fails to classify the contact as hostile or friendly due to distorted signal propagation. 

          b.  Nearby merchant vessel radar emissions (unintentionally amplified by ducting) compound the ambiguity.

4.  Crisis Response Activation

          a.  06:30 Local: Battle stations manned, CIWS systems activated.

          b.  06:32: F/A-18E Super Hornet (VFA-136) on deck loses securing during evasive maneuvers, sliding into the sea as Truman executes a hard 35° turn at 30+ knots.

          c.  06:34: AEGIS destroyers USS Stout (DDG-55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109) attempt verification but struggle with shared radar distortion.

5.  Aftermath

          a.  06:40: Contact disappears - determined to be radar ghost from a weather balloon caught in ducting layer.

          b.  Casualties: Aircraft lost (similar to April 29 real-world incident.

          c.  Strategic Impact: 24-hour operational pause while CENTCOM investigates radar performance in anomalous conditions.

B.  Structured hypothesis for the CVN-75 radar issues on April 28, 2025, incorporating electronic warfare and environmental factors:

1.  Low-Altitude Missile/Drone Threat

          a. A potential Houthi/Iranian-supplied cruise missile (e.g., Quds-4) or drone flying at low altitude could exploit radar clutter from sea waves, reducing detection range. 

          b.  The Truman's AEGIS-equipped escorts might have been affected by radar ducting-atmospheric layers trapping radar waves, creating skip zones.

2.  Jamming/Deception Tactics

          a.  Spoofed Navigation Signals: Adversaries could have exploited vulnerabilities in SATCOM or AIS (as highlighted in the March 10 collision analysis), feeding false positional data to the strike group.

          b.  GPS Jamming: Iranian electronic warfare assets (e.g., radar ships or commercial vessels) might have disrupted GPS-dependent systems, affecting radar correlation with real-time positioning.

3.  Sensor Degradation

          a.  False Returns: Weather conditions (e.g., sea spray, temperature inversions) or biological interference (e.g., bird swarms) could generate phantom radar contacts, diverting attention from actual threats.

          b.  Shadowing/Reflections: Nearby merchant vessels or the Truman’s own superstructure might have created blind spots, masking inbound threats.

4.  Human-System Interaction Failure

          a.  Overreliance on Automation: Bridge crews might have prioritized electronic readouts over visual confirmation, mirroring the March 10 collision where compromised systems overrode human judgment.

          a.  Fatigue/Procedural Gaps: High operational tempo in contested waters could lead to lapses in manual radar cross-verification protocols.

5.  Scenario Reconstruction

          a.  A cruise missile/drone approaching at wave-top altitude might have been masked by clutter, while jamming degraded AEGIS radar fidelity. 

          b.  The Truman’s sudden evasive turn-potentially based on conflicting sensor data-led to the Super Hornet’s loss overboard. 

          c.  The absence of confirmed debris or missile intercepts suggests either a false radar track (e.g., atmospheric anomaly) or a successful electronic deception preventing proper threat classification.

PART IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS

     The USS Harry S. Truman’s loss of an F/A-18E Super Hornet and tow tractor on April 28, 2025, has drawn scrutiny from press and social media, focusing on conflicting narratives and operational risks. Key points of skepticism include:

1. Discrepancy in Official vs. Unofficial Accounts

          a.  The Navy’s official statement attributes the loss to a loss of control during towing in the hangar bay.

          b.  Multiple defense sources and media outlets, including CNN, cite preliminary reports suggesting the carrier executed a sharp evasive maneuver to avoid Houthi fire, contributing to the mishap.

          c.  This discrepancy has fueled speculation about the Navy’s transparency regarding operational threats.

2. Operational Context and Houthi Threats

          a.  The incident occurred amid intensified Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and U.S. naval assets, including recent claims by the group of targeting the Truman.

          b.  Social media commentators question whether evasive actions-such as the described “zig-zag” maneuvers causing significant ship tilt.

          c.  Compromised deck safety, a concern amplified by the $60–70 million loss.

3. Investigation and Accountability

          a.  While the Navy has initiated an investigation the lack of immediate details about recovery efforts or corrective measures has drawn criticism.           b.  Media outlets emphasize the absence of clarity on whether the aircraft was armed or if recovery is feasible.

4.  Social Media Reactions

          a.  Platforms like Instagram and Twitter/X highlight concerns over the Navy’s initial injury reports (later clarified to one minor injury) and echo skepticism about the adequacy of current protocols and echo skepticism about the adequacy of current protocols for securing aircraft during evasive maneuvers. 

          b.  Memes and commentary often juxtapose the carrier’s agility with the vulnerability of its deck operations.

PART V. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1.  Radar Spoofing

     Radar spoofing is an electronic countermeasure technique designed to deceive radar systems by generating false target signals. Here's a structured breakdown:

          a.  Core Concept: Spoofing involves creating fake radar echoes to mislead operators or automated systems into detecting non-existent targets or misidentifying real ones.

          b.  Signal Replay: Attackers record incoming radar pulses and retransmit them with delays or frequency shifts to alter perceived target distance or velocity.

          c.  False Echo Generation: Systems synthesize multiple fake echoes with randomized spacing to overload radar processors and mask real targets.

          d.  Synchronization Challenges: Effective spoofing requires precise timing (e.g., matching radar pulse repetition intervals) to avoid detection by anomaly-checking algorithms.

2. Technical Analysis of Failure Modes

Factor Contribution to Error

          a.  Atmospheric Ducting: Trapped radar waves created false low-altitude corridor.

          b.  Sea Clutter High sea state increased false positive risk for low-flying targets.

          c.   EW Limitations SLQ-32 unable to resolve spoofed signature amidst distorted returns.

          d.  Human Factors Stress-induced confirmation bias during high-tempo response.

3.  Supporting Evidence Table

Factor Evidence from Incidents Relevance to April 28 Event

          a.  Radar Clutter Waves/spray caused false returns in historical naval accidents Explains potential failure to distinguish low-flying missile from sea clutter

          b.  Jamming Iranian radar ships actively support Houthi targeting SATCOM/AIS vulnerabilities previously exploited in March collision

          c.  Atmospheric Effects Radar ducting documented in Red Sea operations Skip zones could hide inbound threats from AEGIS systems

          d.  Human Error Hierarchical bridge culture cited in March collision Similar pressure to trust automated systems during evasive maneuvers

4.  CVN-75 Website: (Unconfirmed if official)

https://www.ussharrystrumanfoundation.org/truman-leadership

Data recovery: Perplexity AI, media primary sources.

Image:  https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2020/april/sonar-sea-services

Report prepared by:

JCL, USMC, (212xxxx-2533), RadioComm, RLT- 27. BaseDef., 3MarDiv.

END OF REPORT//CLASSIFIED

After Action Report--Aircraft Carrier Mishap--F-18 Overboard, Red Sea

HEADQUARTERS

Sub-Unit One, 1st Radio Bn.(-) (Rein) 

1st MarDiv FMF SFO 90001 

From:   Commanding Officer, 1st Radio Battalion 

To:        HQ, NavCommOps, FMPAC, 

Subj:    Aircraft Carrier Mishap, Red Sea: After Action Report

Enc. (1) Submitted with this report. CLASSIFIED

PART I:     ORGANIZATIONAL DATA 

PART II:   NARRATIVE SUMMARY 

PART III:  TECHNICAL ASPECTS 

PART IV:  CIVIL AFFAIRS 

PART V:    SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 

PART I: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA 

    Organizational chart structure for the USS Harry S. Truman incident response, based on standard naval hierarchy and ICS principles adapted to this specific event:

1.  Incident Command Structure

Incident Commander

(Carrier Commanding Officer - O6 Captain)

├─ Safety Officer (Investigates deck procedures/equipment failure)

├─ Public Affairs Officer (Handles media inquiries about $60M loss)

├─ Legal Counsel (Advises on liability/recovery implications)

└─ Liaison Officer (Coordinates with Houthi threat response teams)

2.  Operational Response Structure

Operations Section Chief (Air Boss/Deputy CO)

├─ Flight Deck Division

│ └─ Towing Crew Supervisor (Directly involved in accident)

├─ Air Wing Commander (CAG) (O5/O6 - Oversees aviation units)

│ ├─ Squadron Commanders (F/A-18E unit leadership)

│ └─ Maintenance Officers (Aircraft handling protocols)

└─ Navigation Branch (Analyzes evasive maneuvers during Houthi attack)

3.  Support Elements

Logistics Section Chief (Supply Dept Head)

├─ Salvage Unit (Assesses recovery feasibility in Red Sea)

├─ Medical Unit (Treats injured sailor - minor reported injury)

└─ Equipment Unit (Investigates tow tractor failure)

4.  Planning Section Chief (Operations Officer)

├─ Situation Unit (Tracks Houthi threat status)

├─ Resources Unit (Manages aircraft inventory status)

└─ Demobilization Unit (Plans recovery/continuity ops)

5.  Finance/Admin Section (Ship's Admin Officer)

└─ Cost Analysis Unit ($60M loss assessment/insurance)

6.  External Coordination

Intelligence/Investigations Section (NCIS/Navy JAG)

├─ Accident Investigation Board (Formal Navy inquiry team)

└─ Combat Systems Integration (Houthi drone/missile threat analysis)

PART II: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

     1. On April 28, 2025, a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter jet was lost at sea after falling from the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier during operations in the Red Sea. The $60 million aircraft, assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 136, was being towed in the hangar bay when the crew lost control, causing both the jet and its tow tractor to plunge into the water.

2.  Cause: 

          a.  Early reports suggest the carrier executed a sharp evasive maneuver to avoid incoming Houthi drone/missile fire, contributing to the loss of control during towing.

3.  Casualties:

          a.  All personnel were accounted for, with one sailor sustaining minor injuries after jumping clear.

4.  Operational context: 

          a.  The Truman Carrier Strike Group has been actively engaged in U.S. military operations against Houthi rebels in Yemen, conducting daily strikes since March.

5.  Investigation: 

          a.  The Navy confirmed the aircraft submerged and launched an inquiry, while maintaining the strike group remains "fully mission capable."

6. Casualties:

          a.  Minor injury to one sailor, non-combat related.

PART III: TECHNICAL ASPECTS

1.  Aircraft and Equipment

          a.  Aircraft type: F/A-18E Super Hornet.

          b.  Assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 136.

          c.  Cost: 

                    (1)  Reported between $56 million and $70 million.

                    (2)  Most sources citing ~$60 million.

2.  Tow tractor: 

          a.  A small vehicle used to maneuver aircraft in hangar bays.

3.  Operational Circumstances

          a.  Location: 

                    (1)  Hangar bay of USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75).

          

4.  Activity: 

          a.  Routine towing operation to reposition aircraft for flight operations.

5.  Recovery status: 

          a.  Aircraft submerged, recovery efforts deemed unlikely due to operational constraints.

PART IV: CIVIL AFFAIRS

     The loss of a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet from the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea on April 28, 2025, drew immediate media attention and official responses:

1. Press Coverage

          a.  Incident Details: 

                     (1) Major outlets like CNN, CBS News, and Reuters reported the jet’s loss during routine towing operations, emphasizing its $60–70 million value.

2. Official Statements

          a.  Navy Response: 

                    (1) The Navy confirmed the aircraft and tow tractor were lost overboard during hangar bay operations, with personnel accounted for and an investigation launched.

3. Social Media and Public Reaction

          a.  No direct social media commentary from official accounts was cited in reports. However, the incident’s timing amid heightened Middle East tensions-particularly Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.

4.  USS Harry S. Truman Attack: 

          a.  Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced a joint operation involving naval, air, and missile forces targeting the USS Harry S. Truman and its accompanying warships in response to U.S. strikes.

PART V: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1.  (In progress)

     a.  Data sources: 

                    (1)  Perplexity AI.

                    (2)  Available media, social media outlets.

2.  Image:

https://www.radioblvd.com/wwii_communications_gear_part1.htm

3. Report prepared by JCL, USMC, (212Xxxx-2533) 

    China Beach Comm Relay, RVN.

END OF REPORT

CLASSIFIED

OCMCS--Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security--Command Chronology

 HEADQUARTERS 

1st Marine Division (Rein.), FMF 

Camp Pendleton, California 9xxx2 

From:    Commanding Officer, 27th Marine Regiment (-) (React.)

To:         Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein.) 

Subj.      Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security (OCMCS)

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2B 

CLASSIFIED 

OCMCS--Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security--Command Chronology

PART I.    ORGANIZATIONAL DATA 

1.  Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security (OCMCS)

        a.  Director, OCMCS:

                        (1)  Responsible for overall leadership, strategic direction, and interagency coordination.

        b.  Deputy Director, OCMCS

                        (1)  Assists the Director; oversees daily operations and cross-division collaboration.

        c.  Policy & Compliance Division Chief

                        (1)  Policy Analysts

                        (2)  Compliance Officers

        d.  Operations & Incident Response Division Chief

                        (1)  Incident Response Team Leads

                        (2)  Cybersecurity Analysts

        e.  Technology & Systems Security Division Chief

                        (1)  Systems Engineers

                        (2)  Encryption Specialists

        f.  Training & Outreach Division Chief

                        (1)  Training Coordinators

                        (2)  Outreach Specialists

        g.  Regional Coordinators (East, West, Central)

                        (1)  Regional Support Staff

2.  Media Liaison Branch

        a.  The Media Liaison Branch serves as the primary interface between the Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security (OCMCS) and external media organizations. Its mission is to ensure accurate, timely, and secure communication of information to the public, while safeguarding operational security (OPSEC) and supporting the office’s strategic objectives.

        b.  Branch Structure and Key Staff Roles

                        (1)  Chief, Media Liaison Branch:  Leads the branch, sets media strategy, coordinates with OCMCS leadership, oversees all operations.

                            (2)  Deputy Chief:  Assists the Chief, manages day-to-day operations, acts as Chief in their absence.

                            (3)  Media Relations Officers:  Serve as primary points of contact for national, regional, and local media; draft press materials.

                            (4)  Public Affairs Specialists:  Prepare briefings, talking points, and media kits; support spokespersons and subject matter experts.

                            (5)  OPSEC Advisor:  Reviews all communications for security compliance; coordinates with security and legal staff.

3.  Locations

        a. Washington, DC:  

                        (1)  Policy & Compliance Division.

                        (2)  Develops security policies, compliance programs, and liaises with federal agencies.

        b. Fort Meade, MD:

                        (1)  Operations & Incident Response Division

                        (2)  Manages real-time incident response, threat monitoring, and crisis management.

        c.  San Antonio, TX

                            (1)  Technology & Systems Security Division

                            (2)  Oversees secure communications technology, encryption, and system hardening.

        d.  Colorado Springs, CO

                            (1)  Training & Outreach Division

                            (2)  Conducts training for civilian and military personnel; public outreach and awareness.

        e.  Atlanta, GA; Los Angeles, CA, Chicago, IL

                            (1)  Regional Coordination Offices

                            (2)  Coordinates with local agencies, supports regional operations, and ensures nationwide coverage.

4.  The OCMCS operates secure facilities with restricted access, including Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), to safeguard classified communications equipment and information.  

PART II    NARRATIVE SUMMARY 

1.  Mission and Purpose

        a.  The Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security (OCMCS) is a specialized agency dedicated to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communications between civilian agencies and military entities. 

                            (1)  Develop, implement, and sustain secure communications infrastructure and protocols that enable seamless, interoperable, and resilient information exchange during routine operations, emergencies, and joint missions.

2.  Core Functions

        a.  Develops and maintains cryptographic solutions and secure key management systems for both civilian and military stakeholders. 

                            (1)  Ensure that sensitive information is protected at all classification levels, up to and including TOP SECRET.

        b.  Provides full lifecycle support for communications security (COMSEC) equipment.

                            (1)  Procurement, deployment, maintenance, repair, and secure disposal, serving as a central logistics and accountability hub for secure communications assets.

        c.  Facilitates the secure distribution and management of cryptographic key material. 

                            (1)  Leverage advanced electronic key distribution systems and devices to support rapid and secure communications in both enterprise and tactical environments.

        d.  Coordinates with the National Security Agency (NSA) and other defense agencies.

                            (1)  Set common protocols and standards, promoting interoperability and secure information sharing with allied, coalition, and interagency partners.

2. Functions

        a.  Integrates civilian and military personnel, fostering a culture of mutual awareness and continuous training to bridge gaps in understanding and operational practice between sectors.

        b.  Maintains a robust network of forward repair and support activities to provide rapid, field-level assistance for COMSEC systems during joint operations and crisis response.

3. Strategic Goals

        a.  Enhance awareness and training across agencies to ensure all participants understand the importance and methods of secure civilian-military communication.

        b.  Implement and continuously improve interoperable communications systems that withstand cyber threats, physical attacks, and evolving technological challenges.

        c.  Build and sustain a “network of networks” that connects civilian and military communication nodes, enabling efficient information dissemination and coordinated decision-making during multi-agency operations.

4.  Key Activities

        a.  Routine assessment and analysis of communications security posture, identifying vulnerabilities and implementing mitigation strategies.

        b.  Dissemination of best practices, technical primers, and operational guidelines to all stakeholders, ensuring a unified approach to communications security.

        c.  Support for emergency communications, ensuring that critical information reaches the right people at the right time, particularly during incidents that require joint civilian-military response.

5.  Impact

        a.  By serving as the central authority for civilian-military communications security, the OCMCS ensures that both sectors can operate with confidence, knowing that their information exchanges are protected from adversaries and resilient against disruption. This capability is vital for national security, effective disaster response, and the successful execution of joint missions at home and abroad.

PART III   CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 

1.  Initial Concept and Drafting (Months 0–3)

        a.  Stakeholders (DoD, relevant civilian agencies, congressional committees) identify the need for a new office and define its scope, responsibilities, and structure.

        b.  Drafting of proposed legislation begins, including:

                            (1)  Mission statement and authorities.

                            (2)  Appointment process for the office head (e.g., congressional commission or presidential appointment with Senate confirmation).

2. Legislative Introduction and Committee Review (Months 4–7)

        a.  Bill introduced in the House and/or Senate and referred to relevant committees (e.g., Armed Services, Homeland Security, Intelligence).

                            (1)  Committee hearings and markups, with input from subject matter experts and stakeholders.

                            (2)  Amendments made as needed, potentially modeling after recent changes to legislative agency appointments (e.g., commission-based selection).

3. Congressional Approval (Months 8–12)

        a.  Bill reported out of committee and brought to the floor for debate and vote in both chambers.

        b.  If passed, sent to the President for signature (if not solely a congressional entity).

        c.  Upon enactment, the office is legally established.

4. Organizational Stand-Up (Months 13–18)

        a.  Appointment of interim leadership or formation of a congressional commission to select the office head.

        b.  Recruitment of core staff, establishment of initial policies, and securing of facilities.

        c.  Coordination with DoD CIO, Army G-6, and other relevant agencies to align communications security protocols.

 5. Policy and Implementation Planning (Months 19–24)

        a. Development of detailed implementation plans, 

                            (1)  Communications security (COMSEC) policies (cryptographic, transmission, emission, and physical security).

                            (2)  Integration with existing military and civilian COMSEC programs.

                            (3)  Initial budget allocations and resource planning.

6. Full Operational Capability (Months 25–36)

        a. Office achieves initial operation capability, begins oversight and support functions.

        b.  Full staffing, deployment of secure communications systems, interagency coordination.

        c.  Regular reporting to Congress.

PART IV.   SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS 

1. Organizational Structure and Roles

        a.  Establish a clear chain of command and responsibility, including both civilian and military personnel, to ensure coordinated policy, oversight, and operational implementation.

        b.  Define administrative groups for policy formulation, correspondence management, and top secret control.

        c.  Assign technical groups for liaison, intelligence gathering, and cryptologic analysis.

2. Policy and Procedure Development

        a.  Formulate and enforce administrative procedures, security policies, and regulations for communications security (COMSEC)

        b.  Coordinate application and supervision of these policies across all relevant divisions and branches

3. COMSEC Material Management

        a.  Oversee the procurement, distribution, storage, and destruction of cryptographic keys and controlled cryptographic items.

        b.  Maintain cryptographic accounts and ensure compliance with key management protocols at all organizational levels.

4. Technical Control and Network Oversight

        a.  Implement real-time transmission system configuration, quality assurance, alternate routing, patching, testing, and restoration of communication paths.

        b.  Operate Technical Control Facilities (TCFs) as interfaces between transmission elements and users, ensuring 24/7 monitoring and rapid response capabilities.

5. Physical and Logical Security Measures

        a.  Supervise physical security of facilities, including access controls, surveillance, and cleanliness of secure areas.

        b.  Ensure logical security through network segmentation, firewalls, intrusion detection, and secure communications protocols.

6. Communications Surveillance and Traffic Analysis

        a.  Continuously monitor network traffic for anomalies, congestion, or unauthorized access.

        b.  Analyze communication procedures and practices to identify discrepancies or security violations, and recommend corrective actions.

7. Intelligence Integration and Threat Assessment

        a.  Gather and evaluate intelligence on foreign cryptologic capabilities and potential threats to communication systems.

        b.  Maintain liaison with external intelligence agencies and provide periodic threat reports to leadership.

8. Incident Response and Continuity Planning

        a.  Develop and maintain incident response procedures for communication security breaches or system failures.

        b.  Ensure continuity of operations through redundant systems, alternate routing, and disaster recovery plans.

9.  Training and Compliance

        a.  Provide ongoing training for civilian and military personnel on COMSEC procedures and responsibilities.

        b.  Conduct regular inspections and compliance audits to enforce adherence to security policies and standards.

10. Documentation and Reporting

        a.  Maintain comprehensive records of all COMSEC activities, including correspondence, key management, and incident reports.

        b.  Compile historical data and maintain reference materials relevant to division operations.

PART V     CIVIL AFFAIRS 

1.  Press Reaction

        a.  Scrutiny and Transparency Demands: 

                            (1)  The press would likely scrutinize the creation of an Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security, raising questions about its purpose, oversight, and potential impacts on civil liberties and transparency. 

                            (2)  Media outlets often emphasize the need for government accountability, especially regarding any agency with the power to monitor or regulate communications between civilians and the military.

        b.  National Security Framing: Coverage would likely highlight the office’s role in protecting national security, particularly in the context of increasing cyber threats and the need for secure communications infrastructure.

                            (1)  Journalists may also investigate whether such an office could be used to restrict the flow of information or limit press access to military operations.

        c.  Civil-Military Relations: The press might analyze how this office fits within broader civil-military relations, referencing historical norms that require the military to remain apolitical and under civilian control.

                            (1)  Debate over whether the office strengthens or undermines these principles.

2.  Social Media Reaction

        a.  Debate Over Privacy and Free Speech: Social media users would likely express concern about potential government overreach, especially regarding surveillance and the security of personal communications. 

                            (1)  Discussions might center on First Amendment rights and the risks of censorship, particularly if the office has authority over civilian communications platforms.

        b.  Misinformation and Viral Narratives: 

                            (1)  Social media platforms could become a battleground for competing narratives. Some users might spread misinformation or conspiracy theories about the office’s true intentions, while others could defend its necessity for national defense.

        c.  Calls for Oversight and Public Input: 

                            (1)  Grassroots campaigns or hashtags demanding transparency, public oversight, and clear boundaries for the office’s activities. 

                            (2)  Social media empowers users to organize and amplify concerns rapidly, increasing pressure on policymakers to clarify the office’s mandate and safeguards.

3.  Contextual Insights

        a.  Military Communication Norms: The military is expected to communicate strategic narratives as directed by civilian authorities, maintaining an apolitical stance.

        b.  Social Media’s Double-Edged Role: 

                            (1)  While social media can enhance communication and transparency, it also poses operational and security risks for the military, requiring careful policy and education to mitigate these risks.

        c.  Legal Precedents: Recent Supreme Court rulings highlight the complexity of government officials’ use of social media, especially regarding free speech and state action.

4.  Summary

        a.  The hypothetical creation of an Office of Civilian-Military Communications Security would likely prompt significant debate in both the press and on social media. 

                            (1)  The press would focus on transparency, oversight, and the office's impact on civil-military relations, while social media would amplify concerns about privacy, free speech, and government overreach. 

                            (2)  Both arenas would demand clear guidelines, accountability, and public engagement to ensure the office’s legitimacy and respect for democratic norms.

PART VI.   SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 

Table One: Timeline 

Phase	Key Activities	Estimated Duration
Concept & Drafting	Define mission, draft legislation	0–3 months
Committee Review	Hearings, markups, amendments	4–7 months
Congressional Approval	Floor votes, enactment	8–12 months
Organizational Stand-Up	Leadership selection, initial staffing and setup	13–18 months
Policy & Implementation	Develop policies, budget, interagency coordination	19–24 months
Full Operational Capability	Begin operations, reporting, full integration	25–36 months

Table Two:  Key Considerations

Factor	Press Reaction	Social Media Reaction
Transparency	Demand for details, oversight, and reporting	Calls for public involvement, watchdog efforts
Civil Liberties	Concern over press freedom and access	Worries about privacy, free speech, and rights
National Security	Framed as necessary for defense	Debates over trade-offs with personal freedoms
Misinformation	Investigative reporting to clarify facts	Potential for viral rumors and polarization

Data: Congressional Record, Perplexity AI.

Image:  https://www.gettyimages.in/photos/saigon-1950s

Report prepared by: JCL, Pvt. USMC (212xxxx-2533) Radio Communications, 27th Regt. Landing Team (RLT) HQ, Duong Son 2, RVN (AT998678).

JTF-SB 2025                                                                                      

3/LRC/cr1/5750

CMCC NR _____3______                                                           

Ser. No. 040-25

COPY _1__ OF __10__COPIES                                                    

May 2025  

END OF REPORT